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ABSTRACT
Urban downtowns have changed since September 1 1, 2001, sprouting bollards, planters, and barriers
installed on the pretense of improved safety and security. While these interventions protect buildings
from vehicle bombs, they have not been properly integrated into the fabric of the downtown, and they
have not conformed to good urban design principles. This thesis explores the intersections of crime
prevention through environmental design (CPTED), physical antiterrorism design (ATD), and principles
guiding the design of public spaces. The thesis focuses on the processes whereby antiterrorism design
interventions are sited in Boston and New York and examines current installations. Ultimately, the author
argues for better integration of antiterrorism interventions with both CPTED and urban design principles,
suggesting that public education and a London-like 'ring of steel' are the best ways to secure downtowns
without compromising unique urban character.
First, the thesis provides an account of antiterrorism design history within the United States, and follows
this with a description of how leading documents articulate antiterrorism design principles at different
scales. Next, the evolution of place-based crime prevention strategies is explored, ending with a
discussion of CPTED, and a description of this strategy at different scales. A comparison of ATD and
CPTED principles reveals that there are few irresolvable discrepancies between the two design strategies.
Pictures from downtown Boston and New York are provided throughout the thesis to illustrate ATD and
CPTED 'dos' and 'don'ts.'
In the second half of the thesis, ATD and CPTED policies of downtown Boston and New York are
examined in pursuit of synergies and innovations in design processes. At multiple sites in these cities,
ATD violates both CPTED and the principles of good urban design. According to theory discussed
earlier in the thesis, these discrepancies are not obvious outcomes. Ultimately, the author argues that
ATD should be optimized through the use of CPTED strategies and humanized through the use of civic
design principles.
Thesis Supervisor: Susan Silberberg-Robinson
Title: Lecturer in Urban Design and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
"Architecture is the will of an epoch translated into space."
--Ludwig Mies van der Rohe
The events of September 11, 2001 marked a paradigm shift in the long-held interests and policies
of the United States of America. Suddenly, the outside world was perceived as a hostile place, and
terrorists could leap from nowhere or anywhere and rain damage upon American cities and citizens. For
the first time in over a century, the United States perceived itself as vulnerable. Furious and frightened,
the nation lashed out.
The legacy of America's reaction to September 11th is documented in wars, policies, and prisons.
And, for those who can read the urban environment, the American reaction to 9/11 continues to manifest
itself on the tableau of the city. Physical antiterrorism interventions dot downtowns and financial districts
of most major urban areas (and even some minor ones). In fact, antiterrorism measures are now so
numerous, pervasive, and routine that we rarely take notice. In the words of the authors of "The Terror
City Hypothesis,"
A culture of intensified (yet routine and almost mundane) militarization now pervades daily life
in America's roster of world cities. In turn, the militarization of urban life helps to reinforce the
widespread perception of a new urban vulnerability (Gray and Wyly 2007, 330).
Indeed, while Americans seem acutely aware of the vulnerabilities to terrorist attack, they also seem to
have largely forgotten previous outrage over physical antiterrorism interventions.
Antiterrorism interventions take many shapes, including that of surveillance, altered vehicular
and pedestrian pathways, and hardened building lobbies and perimeters. These last two, hardened lobbies
and building perimeters, are perhaps the easiest to recognize (and the most difficult to avoid). Hardened
perimeters feature bollards, barriers, and fences, while hardened lobbies feature metal detectors,
turnstiles, and guards (with or without automatic weapons). While these interventions, known collectively
as methods of 'target hardening,' are most closely associated with our post-9/l1 world, many were
conceived well before the events of that day.
Target hardening as a design resource and anti-crime strategy was made popular through a
movement known as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). CPTED endeavors to
create design interventions that focus on crime opportunity reduction. Target hardening is a method of
reducing the opportunity for crime through physically intimidating infrastructure. The idea harkens back
to medieval architecture: build a fortress to show strength and frighten enemies.
Though target hardening emerged from CPTED, the early thinkers of the movement, Oscar
Newman and C. Ray Jeffery, were quick to dismiss the concept as an incomplete solution. While target
hardening creates a hostile environment for one's enemies, it also creates a hostile environment for daily
users. Sometimes criminals even see target hardening as a challenge rather than a deterrent.
Additionally, focusing solely on target hardening distracts from the opportunity to create other CPTED
interventions. Without multiple approaches, CPTED fails to achieve the desired results of reducing crime
through environmental design.
Often, counterterrorism design relies solely on target hardening. In a 2006 article on urban design
and counterterrorism, author John Hockenberry interviewed landscape architect Len Hopper of the New
York City Housing Authority (Hockenberry 2006). While speaking of target hardening, Hopper lamented
the fear instilled by some antiterrorism interventions and asserted that designs need to incorporate basic
CPTED principles. The holistic CPTED principles, he asserted, would be more successful at deterring
terrorism than target hardening alone.
Hopper also addressed the issue of hostile spaces as created by target hardening. He stated, "You
can increase security to a point where you actually instill fear, and then you have failed spaces"
(Hockenberry 2006). Spaces fail when people are too frightened to linger or enjoy an area. This is
particularly true in dense urban environments, where every iota of non-private or publicly appropriated
outdoor space is valuable to city-dwellers. A hostile space will alienate urbanites, and, according to the
"eyes on the street" theories of Jane Jacobs and Oscar Newman, the emptiness of these places will make
them more susceptible to criminal activity. As such, the urban public realm begs for new answers for
creating security in urban spaces. A new design paradigm is needed to address the possibility of terrorist
attack and recognize the reality of day-to-day crime, while simultaneously supporting vibrant public
spaces.
TENSIONS: THE SOCIAL CONTRACT VS. DEMOCRATIC ARCHITECTURE
Before embarking on this discussion, however, we must first contemplate the unique dilemma
posed by the threat of terrorist attack. The difficulty inherent in planning for and designing buldigns and
spaces in an American city post-9/l1 is the tension between the need of the government to fulfill the
social contract of citizen protection, and the need to allow for the traditional urbanism and social
interaction within democratic societies. Social contract theory is the means by which humans have
attempted to explain the origins of governments and political systems. Many philosophers have opined
about the theory, and most have various conceptions of which type of social contract is most just or
expedient. Social contract theory in a terror-charged nation necessarily conjures the work of Thomas
Hobbes.
In Leviathan, Hobbes asserted that man without government is in a 'state of nature.' In a state of
nature, everyone is entitled to everything, thus resources wars are continually being waged, and life is
"nasty, brutish, and short." However, by relinquishing
O1URS.. to fight tor some personal rights to a governmental entity, that
entity agrees to offer protection, and civil society is
born (Hobbes 1904, 84). By creating policies and
procedures that interrupt urban life and promote target
hardening, the American government is trying to
fulfill its social contract with the American people. It
is attempting to address what Franklin D. Roosevelt
described as one of the four universal freedoms-
freedom from fear (Roosevelt 1941).
It is also relevant here to mention what is
arguably one of the most famous sound bites from yet
another of President Roosevelt's speeches: "the only
thing we have to fear is fear itself' (Roosevelt, First
Inaugural Address 1933). Though in this instance
Roosevelt was referring to the Great Depression, he
FREEDOM FROM FEAR made a timeless observation,and one that is decidedly
Figure 1. Freedom From Fear, by Norman Rockwell applicable to the studies of terrorism. Terrorism, at its
(1943). Source: Government Printing Office for the root, is a tactic whereby its perpetrators seek to inspireOffice of War Information, retrieved from
www.archives.gov fear, and thus exercise a degree of control over a
certain population. According to scholars of terrorism, terrorists do not necessarily seek to spill as much
blood as possible. Terrorists seek to wield fear and uncertainty as weapons through which to achieve
other goals. This psychological manipulation is quite effective. One need go no farther than Abraham
Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs to see that the need for safety is one of the needs upon which human
fulfillment is predicated (Simons, Irwin and Drinnien 1987).
As a result of its interest in fulfilling the social contract and of citizens' demand that it do so, the
government has promoted target hardening and invasive security measures in the nation's capital and in
urban downtowns across the country. Through these measures (and others), the government is trying to
protect the American people. While the motives may be as clear as protecting citizens from acts of terror,
these physical design interventions, imposed in the name of safety, are changing the traditional meaning
conveyed through urban design in American cities. In the words of one author,
The most publicized and cherished buildings, notably government or religious buildings, become
significant symbols that remind everyone whose attention they command that they share a common
heritage and a common future" (Edelman 1995, 75).
Indeed, it is the government and religious buildings that inform the public of the future and also
offer solid reassurance of continuity with the past. With antiterrorism design guidelines and increasing
target-hardening strategies, are our government buildings signifying that our future is stark and terrifying
and that the assurance of our past can no longer be trusted? Antiterrorism design, when based upon target
hardening, is negating the more traditional American downtown. This traditional design is predicated
upon the notion that the downtown is the center of commerce and government. As such, it is required to
be not only open but inviting, and easily navigable for citizens. Do we think that target hardened
buildings create an inviting environment for consumers? Do we truly believe that target hardened
buildings are reflective of a democratic political system?
Even more problematic, policies and guidelines that inform design decisions of public
governmental buildings and land in urban areas also inform the design of those structures and spaces in
the private realm. This is true on both formal and informal grounds. When private companies recognize
security design in government buildings, they must feel compelled to believe that there is a threat. As a
result, they will act in their best interest to preserve assets.
TENSIONS: PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE
At the onset of this project I saw all security decisions as issues of public safety. Now, however, I
recognize that many security decisions (perhaps the majority) are made instead for private safety, or other
reasons. With very few exceptions, the government does not compel private owners to make security
changes or upgrades on their properties. Private buildings must only respond to building codes.
Antiterrorism design guidelines released by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
Interagency Security Committee (ISC), and National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC) are advisory
in nature.
More often than not, it is the decisions of individual private entities that are changing the face of
the city. Public intervention generally ends at the inside of the sidewalk, if not at the width of the street.
In downtowns this public/private struggle is palpable. The public is given very specific clues regarding
the level of privacy expected by certain sites. The trouble with antiterrorism interventions lies in the trend
of converting semi-private/semi-public space into wholly private space, and public space into semi-
private or wholly private space. This is particularly troubling in downtown areas, where quality of public
space is just as important to citizens and consumers as government functions and shopping nodes.
The norm of public space in downtowns is built into the history of American cities. From colonial times
Americans have planned cities around a central public open space, or commons. In the words of two
historians,
The town center, represented by the square, was conceived as a setting for collective
action. People went there to participate in public activities that were often political and
carried communal meanings. The square at the core would serve as the generative space
of the entire settlement, which was laid out from the center outward" (Loukaitou-Sideris
and Banerjee 1998, 38).
As time went on, the town center, or common was flanked by government offices, though the allure of the
open public spaces was increasingly eclipsed by the pull of the central business districts. Sometimes open
public spaces managed to survive, though increasingly they were developed as lucrative real estate for the
city (Loukaitou-Sideris and Banerjee 1998, 99). However, public space, while perhaps no longer manifest
as a 'green commons,' has always been invaluable to successful downtowns. One need look no further
than the commission of the work of William H. Whyte to justify this fact or the elaborate efforts to
convert the above-ground parking garage in Post Office Square to a beautiful public park in Boston's
Financial District.
Urban downtowns have historically provided public space for residents and visitors. Urban
success may even be predicated upon good public space. The urban planner and theorist Kevin Lynch
asserted that people have five basic public space rights: presence, use and action, appropriation,
modification, and disposition (Lynch, A Theory of Good City Form 1981). When antiterrorism design
annexes crucial public space, or even alters it so that stakeholders may no longer have access to these
'five basic rights,' it negatively impacts the urban environment.
There must emerge a watchdog for post-9/11 public space. So far, it seems that MIT lecturer
Susan Silberberg-Robinson and University of Colorado Denver professor Jeremy Nemeth are the best
contenders. However, this job should extend beyond academics to the cities themselves.
Municipalities must endeavor to take control of ad-hoc private decision-making in order to
restore semblance of design order to their urban environments. Only Washington, D.C. appears to have a
grasp on an overarching physical security plan. The rest of the country seems to be interested in allowing
security professionals to work much in the way of architects. However, there are crucial differences in
the processes of architects and security specialists. While architects seem to come onto a site and think
'how can I make this building be a beautiful structure that serves the occupants well and yet is compatible
with the needs of the surrounding urban environment,' it is rare to find a private security firm with the
same mindset. Rogers Marvel, a NYC design firm specializing in physical antiterrorism interventions,
departs from that notion. Rogers Marvel imparts a design philosophy predicated upon a deep
understanding of American downtowns and a belief in the collaborative process between client, security
expert, and designer. The firm believes that all physical antiterrorism interventions should be
simultaneously conceived of as public amenities. This beautiful and strategic thought is, sadly, an
anomaly. However, it represents a model that is multilateral and invested in the principles of civic design,
which will be discussed later in this thesis.
CIvIc DESIGN AND CPTED AS MEANS TO HUMANIZE ANTITERRORISM DESIGN
It is clear from a scan of our urban environments that not all security and design professionals
share the values of firms like Rogers Marvel. As such, there needs to be a new way to conceive of the
antiterrorism design process. It must be reconceived in a manner that is sensitive to downtown urban
environments, and in such a way that the most important goals of antiterrorism design and public space
design are compatible. This thesis pursues the belief that the solution to reconciling antiterrorism
concerns and public space advocacy can be found in CPTED.
CPTED as a process has deep roots in the law enforcement community, and as such, will be
relatively simple to present as a solution to an otherwise hard-to-convince constituency. CPTED
endeavors to create a heightened cognizance of an environment and provide visual clues to both potential
victims and potential offenders in order to avert crime. CPTED attempts to diminish instances of day-to-
day crime.
An examination of CPTED and its goal of crime prevention are especially strategic in light of the
seemingly crime-producing environments of some antiterrorism design. Antiterrorism design, as
described earlier as well as throughout this thesis, often creates a hostile environment for daily users by
scarring downtowns with desolate security zones, repetitive rows of bollards, and threatening architecture.
As a result, it is possible that the interventions designed to keep people safe (from terrorists) are putting
people in danger of increased day-to-day crime. In order to counteract this unpredicted outcome, as well
as discourage inhuman architecture and site design, I propose that CPTED should be fully integrated with
antiterrorism design principles in a holistic approach to safety, security, and Civic Design.
This thesis examines how, why, and where there are conflicts between Antiterrorism Design and CPTED.
Additionally, it relies on the premise that Civic Design as well as public policing of spaces ("eyes on the
street") is imperative for safe and secure places. Ultimately, this thesis explores the reconciliation of
CPTED and Antiterrorism Design and proposes new processes and policies to oversee this reconciliation
and the implementation that follows.
Part I of this thesis looks at the history of Antiterrorism Design and Crime Prevention Design
strategies and how they are supposed to be implemented. Specifically, Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis will
familiarize the reader with the history of Antiterrorism Design (ATD) and then describe the principles of
ATD as they theoretically play out in reality. Chapters 3 and 4 review the history of place-based crime
prevention strategies and then explain CPTED strategies for the downtown urban environment. An
interlude after Part I spells out the exact areas of conflict between ATD and CPTED.
Part II of the thesis explores how ATD and CPTED play out in Boston and New York City, and
offers recommendations framed around Civic Design principles. Specifically, Chapter 5 reviews the ATD
and CPTED conditions in Boston and New York. Chapter 6 introduces Civic Design principles, and
Chapter 7 provides recommendations and concludes the thesis.
The Twentieth Century architect Mies van der Rohe once stated, "Architecture is the will of an
epoch translated into space." I would take it one step further and contend that urban design is the will of
an epoch translated into space. Is the will of this epoch to alter our urban environments solely to adapt to
the aims of the terrorist? Or, instead, should American antiterrorism design strive to be representative of
more democratic design, and one that endeavors to keep people safe from all crime? This thesis
encourages further thought and offers some solutions on the future of security, crime prevention, and
urban design.
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18
CHAPTER 1
ANTITERRORISM DESIGN HISTORY
This chapter will explore the origins and motivations of Antiterrorism Design (ATD) in the
United States. It was not until relatively recently that terrorism was deemed a serious enough condition to
merit research; as such, early design decisions were nearly universally created in reaction to terrorist
events abroad. This chapter will provide background on antiterrorism design history, through to the most
current ATD documents, published in 2009.
INTRODUCTION TO TERRORISM
Before embarking on a discussion of antiterrorism design United States, it is worth defining
'terrorism.' According to Title 22 of the United States Code, section 2656f(d),
The term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually
intended to influence an audience (Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of
Representatives 2009).
This definition rightly distinguishes between senseless acts of violence and acts of terrorism. For
example, the horrific shootings at Columbine and Virginia Tech were not instances of terrorism. Serial
killers are not terrorists. Terrorists are people or groups that practice terrorism-politically motivated
violence intended to influence an audience. However, this is only one working definition. There are
many definitions for terrorism, and many advocates deny that it can even be defined. Instead, some
choose to think about terrorism as occupying ambiguous space within several pre-established dimensions
(Smelser and Mitchell 2002, 16). Still other theorists define terrorism first and foremost as a crime against
the state, and terrorists as criminals.'
Other related, often misused words are 'counterterrorism' and 'antiterrorism.' In the international
community these terms are used interchangeably. Within the United States, however, the two have
distinct meanings. "Counterterrorism" involves collecting information and launching offensive missions
to preempt terrorist attacks. "Antiterrorism" involves defensive measures taken to defend against attacks
(Stepanova 2003). To avoid confusion, this paper will exclusively employ the term 'antiterrorism' when
discussing design, since urban design is truly a defensive, and not offensive, mechanism.
1 This varies notably from politicians who wish to consider terrorism as an act of war. Some theorists argue that
elevating terrorist attacks to acts of war serves to validate the terrorists as having enough status to be acknowledged
as legitimate political players. Instead, these theorists argue that terrorists should be conceived of as heinous
criminals, and punished as such.
'EARLY' ANTITERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES
Modem antiterrorism design is predicated upon "Americans-abroad" militaristic roots which
assume a preexisting hostile environment as a setting for its design interventions. Recognition of the
faulty premise began with public discomfort voiced in newspapers over the altered urban environment
following the 9/11 attacks, and has been reflected in more recent documents, like the Federal Emergency
Management Agency's 2007 guidelines for site design. However, these more recent documents seem
more like band-aids than guidelines, as will be explored later in this thesis.
The history of terrorism, counterterrorism, and antiterrorism in America begins in the early
twentieth century. Antiterrorism design in America, however, has much shallower roots. The concept of
having a design strategy to combat terrorism did not truly begin until after international embassy
bombings in the 1980s (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2007). One particularly heinous attack
took place at the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, when a suicide bomber drove a delivery truck filled
with explosives into the building's lobby, killing sixty-three people (Naftali 2005, 129). As a result,
perimeter protection and access control for buildings were viewed as emerging standards for security at
high-risk buildings. The attacks also inspired government officials to surround the White House with
vehicles and planter-barriers in order to create greater protective setback distance between public roads
and the building. Critics derisively referred to the barriers as "Reagan's flower pots" (Naftali 2005).
It was during this time of increased awareness of terrorist risks that certain terms originated and
goals were articulated. Progressive collapse, glass breakage, and protective setback and perimeter security
were terms that were defined and explored. Threat assessments for building vulnerabilities were
conducted "to determine the extent and type of potential structural and facade damage as a result of blast-
induced loadings, as well as to estimate the likelihood of loss and the extent of injury to people and other
assets, and to explore hazard mitigation options such as possible site, structural, and facade
upgrades/enhancements (if needed) that will provide mitigation for meeting the project-specific ISC
Security Design Criteria requirements" (U.S. General Services Administration 2009).
Even though these terms and ideas became standard for military planners who had to react to
Lebanese bombing, they were not the domain of domestic design professionals until the 1995 Alfred P.
Murrah Courthouse attack, more widely known as the Oklahoma City bombing. The Oklahoma City
Bombing was significant for a number of reasons. First, it was the second terrorist attack on U.S. soil in
two years.2 Second, both terrorist acts had been perpetrated via bombs placed in rented vehicles (a van
and a truck). Third, the Oklahoma City Bombing killed one hundred sixty-eight people: far more people
2 The first attack on New York City's World Trade Center had occurred two years prior, in 1993. Six people died, a
thousand suffered injuries mostly due to smoke inhalation, and the WTC was left with $300 million in property
damages (Anti-Defamation League 2005).
than had ever been murdered in a U.S. terrorist attack in the past 3 . Fourth, and finally, these civilian
deaths (though perhaps not injuries) could have been prevented in both cases by employing some of the
defensive perimeter strategies or access control procedures that the U.S. had been using overseas for the
previous ten years.
The day after the bombing, President William J. Clinton tasked the Department of Justice with
assessing whether other federal buildings were similarly vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Additionally, he
called for preliminary ideas as to how to better secure existing buildings. The Department of Justice
answered the call by creating two committees: the Standards Committee and the Profile Committee. The
first committee "proposed minimum standards pertaining to secure perimeter buffer zones; the security of
entrances and exits and related access procedures; the identification and admittance of employees and
visitors; garage and vehicle service entrances; the location of day care centers; and the use of closed-
circuit television monitoring." The Profile Committee published a Vulnerability Assessment of Federal
Facilities in June of that year (Smith 2007).
Four months after the Vulnerability Assessment was published, President Clinton issued executive
order 12977, which ordered the creation of the Interagency Security Committee (ISC). The ISC was
charged with establishing "policies for security in and protection of Federal facilities," developing
strategy for "ensuring compliance with such standards," and "developing long-term construction
standards for those locations with threat levels or missions that require blast resistant structures or other
specialized security requirements" (Clinton 1995).
Soon after the creation of the ISC, the National Academy Press (the Press created to publish
works by the National Academy of Sciences, the National Research Council, and others) produced a
work, called Protecting Buildings from Bomb Blast. The document originated as a study commissioned
by the Defense Nuclear Agency meant to aid in a discussion regarding whether "design methodologies
and construction techniques developed for the protection of military facilities could be beneficially
applied to civilian architecture" (Committee on Feasibility of Applying Blast-Mitigating -Technologies
and Design Methodologies from Military Facilities to Civilian Buildings 1995). The work asserted that
the United States is vulnerable to terrorist bombing and that it is possible to reduce bomb impact through
certain design retrofits. The document provided some early guidelines for locating high risk commercial
buildings, which included recommendations that "Preferably, the site, its entrances, and the building itself
should all be placed out of alignment with potential high-speed approaches by vehicles" (Protecting
Buildings from Bomb Blast 1995). Vulnerable functions are suggested to be removed from 'uncontrolled
public traffic,' and underground parking is discouraged altogether. There are also many structural
3 Past terrorist attacks on the United States involved few deaths, with the exception of the 1920 attack on New York
City's Wall Street that killed thirty-one people (Naftali 2005).
engineering suggestions. At the same time, concerns regarding too much visible security are
acknowledged:
One consideration in commercial structures is that hardening features may be quite
apparent when installed after the fact in an existing building, and most commercial
building occupants do not want the appearance or the function of the building to be
changed or to advertise their presence, if they are potential targets, by obvious security
measures (Committee on Feasibility of Applying Blast-Mitigating Technologies and
Design Methodologies from Military Facilities to Civilian Buildings 1995, 55).
While the authors aptly articulated these concerns, they were never addressed in the report. Nor were
readers directed to another document, as they were for additional structural questions. Frequently
mentioned were U.S. Army Technical Manual TM 5-853 and USACE's Structural Design for Physical
Security (1995).
Perhaps most notably, the document recognizes that there are scant economic incentives for
retrofitting a building against terrorist attack. The authors note,
Since every element in the development of an investment-grade property must pass a
rigorous cost/benefit analysis to ensure that the added element does not dilute the
anticipated return on investment, the decision to add a nonrevenue element, such as blast-
resistant construction, to a building would be much more likely if there were some cost-
recovery mechanism available. Some of these mechanisms could be tax credits, reduced
insurance costs, or more favorable lender terms. However, none of these mechanisms are
available today, nor are they being contemplated. The most attractive and likely incentive
for including blast protection in an investment property would be finding a long-term
tenant, such as a government agency, that is sensitive to security issues and is willing to
pay a higher rent for a blast-hardened building (Committee on Feasibility of Applying
Blast-Mitigating Technologies and Design Methodologies from Military Facilities to
Civilian Buildings 1995, 67).
While this acknowledgement was astute, the solution (securing a government agency as a tenant) is not
effective for most commercial buildings. Indeed, this solution is located in a section that is supposed to
address the specific needs of commercial buildings.
As can be expected from these statements, it was difficult to get private buildings and agencies to
conform to security guidelines. Mandating changes on public sites, though, was comparatively simple. By
1997 the ISC had created Draft Security Criteriafor the General Services Administration (GSA) to guide
the construction and site design of public buildings (U.S. General Services Administration 2010). The
ISC continued to meet in working groups, ultimately producing a document called Security Design
Criteria for New Federal Buildings and Major Modernization Projects in May 2001. These works are
particularly important, as they signify the first time that security design was recommended for buildings
other than Department of Defense facilities. Before these were released, "security was generally an
afterthought: the last item added and the first item cut from any typical project" (U.S. General Services
Administration 2010). Four months after the ISC and GSA publication, the United States experienced the
most horrific terrorist attack in its history.
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
The events of September 11, 2001 reconfirmed the reality of terrorist attacks on American soil
and put into motion a series of actions and reactions. Panicked building owners rushed to respond to the
attacks in the most immediate ways possible. Armed with quick-fix interventions like jersey barriers and
only the military-inspired GSA standards as guides, urban downtowns became militarized, concrete
mazes.
Recognizing the desire of building owners for more accessible standards and greater guidance for
permanent installations, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) responded with FEMA
426, otherwise known as "A Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings"
(Federal Emergency Management Agency 2003). The goal of the document was to create awareness and
guidelines that would lead to a reduction in building and perimeter damage and minimize the possibility
of casualties should there be future terrorist attacks. As part of the work, FEMA 426 briefly considered
cost in relation to potential benefit, seeking to convey that risk management choices are economic trade-
offs:
Do Nothing -- No cost, greatest risk
Install Reasonable Mitigation measures - Some Cost, Reduced Risk
Harden Building 4 Greatest Cost, Lowest Risk (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2003, 1-44)
FEMA 426 provides multiple extensive checklists designed to engage managers in active analysis
of their buildings, and to help identify potential areas of security improvement. Notably, FEMA 426
devotes section 2.12 to a discussion of incorporating CPTED into site design. In fact, CPTED principles
are built into the remainder of the document, even though they are not explicitly identified as such. The
report claims, "although CPTED principles are not incorporated into the assessment process presented
herein, it is useful to briefly discuss CPTED because it is often entwined with terrorism protection
measures. Indeed, many antiterrorist design approaches are similar to those found in CPTED" (Federal
Emergency Management Agency 2003, 2-59). The section goes on to assert that CPTED principles are
important to understand because utilizing only a 'hardening' approach (as discouraged in most CPTED
literature) can, in fact, lead to a counterproductive security environment. Most importantly, however,
FEMA 426 designated the "four Ds" of Antiterrorism Design:
- Deter: The process of making the target inaccessible or difficult to defeat with the weapon or
tactic selected. It is usually accomplished at the site perimeter using highly visible electronic
security systems, fencing, barriers, lighting and security personnel; and in the building by
securing access with locks and electronic monitoring
devices.
- Detect: The process of using intelligence sharing and The Four Ds of Antiterrorism
security services response to monitor and identify the
threat before it penetrates the site perimeter or
building access points. * DETER
- Deny: The process of minimizing or delaying the DETECT
degree of site or building infrastructure damage or DENY
loss of life or protecting assets by designing or using N DEVALUE
infrastructure and equipment designed to withstand
blast and chemimcal, biological, or raidiolagical
effects.
T Devalue: The process of making the site or building
of little to no value or consequence, from the terrorists' perspective, such that an attack on the
facility would not yield their desired result (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2003, 1-9).
All four of these strategies have distinct design repercussions.
The Department of Homeland Security, though created by presidential directive on October 29,
2001, did not truly begin to issue physical design standards until 2003. By this time it had absorbed the
ISC. In early 2003, a plethora of 9/11 studies emerged, many attempting to model risk, targeting
preferences, and costs and benefits of security interventions. The ISC re-released its Security Design
Criteria for New Federal Office Buildings document with an updated review and commentary
(Interagency Security Committee 2003). The National Strategy for The Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructures and Key Assets of February 2003 was a response to Homeland Security Directive 7, which
sought to mandate Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection. Most notably, it
shifted the dialogne from a discussion of 'national security' (conceived as the responsibility of the
government) to a discussion of 'homeland security' (conceived of as a more civic and collaborative
process of public and private actors) (Department of Homeland Security 2003).
Between 2001 and 2005 the National Capital Planning Commission (the Federal Planning
Agency for Washington, D.C.) released multiple documents and updates that created a comprehensive
plan for the area. Most importantly, the main document, the National Capital Urban Design and Security
Plan, had a centralized goal of creating best practices for designing for security that do not compromise
the appearance of the built environment. NCPC's security website states that
hastily conceived security measures mar the city's beauty and obstruct access to public
streets and spaces. They also contribute to a climate of fear. NCPC helps minimize the
impact of security measures on public accessibility, aesthetic quality, and freedom of
movement throughout the city (National Capital Planning Commission 2010).
While this was not the first time these sentiments were articulated, it was the first time they were
comprehensively addressed. The first security plan was published in 2002 and updated in 2004 and 2005.
NCPC also released a document called "Designing and Testing Perimeter Security Elements" in 2005. It
is clear that for the NCPC site design was a priority, and that the interface of the urban environment with
the public was not only important, but critically vital.
One clear impact of the NCPC was the FEMA 430 document entitled Site and Urban Designfor
Security: Guidance Against Potential Terrorist Attacks. FEMA 430 echoed a design philosophy that was
also strongly influenced by the work of the New York City firm Rogers Marvel. In the document's
preface it states in no uncertain terms that "the designer's role is to ensure that public amenity and the
aesthetics of site surroundings are kept in balance with security needs" (Federal Emergency Management
Agency 2007, iii). FEMA 430 was interested in aiding owners in establishing their building's estimated
level of risk, so as to minimize invasive design elements. It also established undesirable design
interventions, as first described in the NCPC works. For example,
Monotonous repetition of a single element should be avoided. Block after block of the
same element, no matter how attractive, does not create good design. When a continuous
line of bollards approaches 100 feet, they should be interspersed with other streetscape
elements, such as hardened benches, planters, or trees (Federal Emergency Management
Agency 2007, 132).
FEMA 430 also made it very clear that, while codes are only mandatory for government structures, it was
also a document amenable to and useful for private buildings as well.
Since the publication of FEMA 430, FEMA has continued to issue design-related guidelines. The
ISC, too, has continued to update and improve codes. As of 2007, the ISC was working on updating the
Vulnerability Assessment, and to create better security policies through multi-party consensus. According
to one congressional report, "Through greater accountability and oversight, the ISC hopes to provide one
leadership voice to integrate physical security initiatives successfully for the federal government" (Smith
2007, 6). The Department of Homeland Security has also issued a number of reports in recent years,
including a 2008 report on Facility Security Levels Determinations regarding the process of determining
the risk level of a federal facility, a 2009 report on Use of Physical Security Performance Measures,
which requires agencies to assess effectiveness of their physical security programs, and a 2010 document
on Physical Security Criteria for Federal Facilities that establishes a baseline set of physical security
measures for all federal facilities (Department of Homeland Security 2010).
Independent cities and regions have come out with their own security guidelines in recent years.
Some design work is undoubtedly funded by homeland security money, though it is difficult to ascertain
what and how much. New York's physical security plan, Engineering Security, will be discussed in a later
section.
CONCLUSIONS
As indicated by this chapter, modem antiterrorism design is predicated upon Americans-abroad
militaristic roots which assumes a preexisting hostile environment as a setting for its 'four Ds.' The goals
of antiterrorism design remain largely concerns about blast vulnerability, window vulnerability,
progressive collapse, and perimeter security. While guidelines have recently become more sensitive to the
public nature of urban environments, these realizations have yet to be fully integrated onto the grid of the
city.
In the next chapter, the principles of Antiterrorism Design will be discussed as set forth in the
documents discussed above. Antiterrorism Design strategies will be analyzed at the scale of the
downtown, the scale of the street grid, the scale of the site, and the scale of the building. Then each scale
strategies will be appraised through an analysis of the corresponding "Four Ds."
CHAPTER 2
ANTITERRORISM DESIGN IN ACTION
As examined in the history of Antiterrorism Design, the American approach to physically
defending against terrorist bombings is rooted in a militaristic approach. FEMA 426 concisely articulated
the goals of Antiterrorism Design with four words:
Deter: The process of making the target (look) inaccessible or difficult to defeat
Detect: The process of using security services to monitor and identify the threat
Deny: The process of minimizing or delaying damage or loss of life or protecting assets
by designing or using appropriately reinforced infrastructure
Devalue: The process of making the site or building of little to no value or consequence
(Federal Emergency Management Agency 2003, 1-9).
The goals of deterring, detecting, denying, and devaluing can be achieved at different urban scales by
employing different strategies. Since this thesis is particularly concerned with urban downtowns, only
four scales will be analyzed: the scale of the downtown as a whole (the financial, commercial, and
gubernatorial center of most cities, thus making it most prone to terrorist attack), the scale of the grid
within the downtown (the streets and blocks within the downtown), the scale of the business campus or
site (where one entity clearly defines territory), and the scale of a target building.
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Scale of the downtown Scale of the grid: streets and intra-blocks Scale of the site/inter-block Scale of the building
Figure 2. Scales of Downtown. These images indicate the corresponding scale of the intervention mentioned below. Created by author
using ESRI's ArcMap and data layers provided by M.I.T.
The principles articulated above will be revisited as each scale is examined. This will provide an
opportunity to understand how Antiterrorism Design strategies align with Antiterrorism Design goals.
ANTITERRORISM DESIGN DOWNTOWN
While FEMA 430 has a section purporting to address Antiterrorism Design for downtowns, in
reality, the section only addresses issues at a site scale. In truth, there is only one basic strategy that can
be implemented over the entirety of an urban downtown: surveillance. Surveillance can come in a variety
of forms.
The most extreme example of downtown surveillance is London's 'ring of steel.' In the summer
of 1993, London was reeling from multiple attacks launched by the Irish Republican Army. The ring of
steel was initially conceived as an intervention similar to police cordons used in Belfast. When the 'ring'
was initially introduced to London's
Square Mile, it sealed off entrances
and exits to the city. Only seven
entrances remained, and armed guards
were stationed at each road checks.
Officially, the 'ring of steel' was
called the 'Experimental Traffic
Scheme,' and the project was
marketed as an environmental and
traffic congestion reduction strategy.
Figure 3. London's Ring of Steel in 1997. 'Ring' designated by thick black line. The security impact, however, was
Dotted line represents the boundary of the City of London. Source: Terrorism' obvious. There was a separate ringRisk, and the Global City by Jon Coaffee, p. 129 (2009).
maintained outside the ring of steel
known as the 'collar,' which received extra police attention as those businesses along the collar were
concerned that terrorists would simply leave bombs just outside the ring. Later, the City stepped up
surveillance with three different camera systems. The City Security Advisor stated that
CCTV has two implications related to the IRA. A principal aim of an IRA terrorist when
carrying out an attack is not to get caught, therefore CCTV is a highly visible deterrent
both when carrying out an attack and when planning one through surveillance.. .the key
aim of CCTV in this respect was to alter the perception of risk for the IRA in the hope
that they will go elsewhere and export the threat. The message CCTV gives is-yes you
could get away with planting a bomb, as this is very difficult to stop, but you could well
get caught on film which will be circulated all over the world including Ireland, and
therefore you will always be looking over your shoulder (Coaffee 2009, 114).
Security cameras recorded every vehicle entering the Square Mile, and "by the end of 1993 there were
more than seventy police controlled cameras covering the City" (Coaffee 2009, 115). Businesses were
encouraged to get their own cameras and join a city-wide program of footage-sharing called "Camera
Watch."
The London example of the ring of steel is an extreme instance of implementing surveillance for
counterterrorism. More commonly, urban areas will increase police presence. Increasing the number of
police in an area not only creates a display of force and vigilance, it also increases the number of aware
individuals looking for unusual behavior. While a large, visible police force will prove intimidating for
potential terrorists or other aggressors, it can also unintentionally frighten civilians away from
downtowns. To civilians, large shows of force may seem to indicate that a place is likely to be unsafe
(hence the need for the force in the first place). Common sense suggests that avoiding these places is the
best option.
Also common is the creation of a Business Improvement District (BID), which enables an area to
pool resources and invest in wayfinding systems', seasonal events, maintenance, and security. BID
security forces tend to be less threatening than city police forces. Citizens perceive BID security
differently than police, and are more apt to find their presence helpful than intimidating.
The least discussed type of surveillance can come from urbanites themselves. Requesting an
urban populace to be vigilant is effective enough that it is commonly employed in urban transportation
centers. Pre-recorded messages in subways or on buses can beseech a captive audience to be aware of
their surroundings and to report suspicious bags or behavior. Besides enlisting additional eyes to increase
vigilance, these announcements are important instances (and sometimes the only ones) when individuals
are alerted to the issue of ongoing threats.
Table 1. How ATD Strategies can be fulfilled at the scale of the Downtown.
Deter Police or security presence can act as a deterrent.
Detect The most obviously fulfilled by this scale's surveillance imperatives.
More vigilant parties make detection more likely.
Deny N/A.
Devalue N/A. In fact, increasing surveillance could actively work against
devaluing the downtown-increasing security indicates value.
ANTITERRORISM DESIGN FOR THE GRID
At the inter-block and street level, antiterrorism design gives particular weight to concerns
regarding vehicle impact vectors. Where target buildings are adjacent to roads that provide opportunities
to accelerate to high speeds, the road configuration must be changed. There are three related antiterrorism
1 Wayfinding systems are explained in more detail in the "CPTED in Action" section.
I
design possibilities. One strategy is to completely block off the street to vehicles, and, depending on
security needs, even pedestrian access. Another option is to regulate traffic through a series of check
points. The third option is to design the adjacent street in such a way that it is impossible for a vehicle to
accelerate to high speeds. All three of these conditions can be a part of or effectively create something
known as a 'security zone.'
Security zones are "marginal spaces created as a result of security enhancements" (Hollander and
Whitfield 2005). While the term was initially coined by the General Services Administration to describe
layers of security that will be detailed in the next section, 'security zone' is now synonymous with both a
desired impact (an additional setback for urban infrastructure) and with unappealing and unused space in
a city. The unintended consequences of a security zone are similar to other unintended consequences of
antiterrorism design: the marginalized space is unappealing and deserted, frightening potential users.
This, in turn, minimizes the number of people who are available in an area to spot unusual or aggressive
behavior (Hollander and Whitfield 2005).
Table 2. How ATD Strategies can be fulfilled at the scale of the Grid.
Deter Blocked off streets or check points will deter potential attackers, who
would not be able to find an alternative route or procure clearance.
Detect Cheekpoints aid in detection of terrorists.
Deny Blocking off a street and/or the creation of a security zone physically
denies access to a site.
Devalue N/A
ON LOCATION: SECURITY ZONES
Figure 4. Photographs by Sara Rothrock.
Boston's Beverly Street security zone. While it is unclear as to what it is protecting (Mass Pike? North
Station?) and why (other transit hubs are located below streets, why not this one?), it is clear that this is a
marginalized area, created by planters and jersey barriers-the tools of antiterrorism design.
ON LOCATION: VEHICULAR EXCLUSION
Vehicle exclusion
through physical
design is an effective
way of removing the
threat of a car, truck,
or van bomb from an
area. Preventing
vehicle entry can be
accomplished through
the introduction of
bollards, planters,
ditches, or other
prohibitive structures.
Adding dropped
bollards and/or a
gatehouse allows for a
screening process to
permit the admission
of certain vehicles.
Top: Getting the
message across with a
rising wedge at Duane
St. at Lafayette St. in
New York City.
Bottom: This sign at
Boston's John F.
Kennedy Federal
Building does not
simply instruct- it
warns.
Figure 5. Photograph by Sara Rothrock.
Figure 6. Photograph by Sara Rothrock.
ANTITERRORISM DESIGN AT THE SITE
The site level of the urban environment involves the sidewalk and building yard surrounding a
potential target building. This level is considered most vital for physical antiterrorism interventions by
security specialists and governmental guidelines. A physical security plan at the site level can include
active or passive barriers that are visible or invisible to passersby, and that can be permeable,
impermeable, or guarded.
Special care will be taken at the outermost boundary of the site, since stopping a vehicle or
aggressor at the sidewalk affords a greater standoff distance. Standoff distance is "the distance between a
barrier and a protected building" (The National Capital Planning Commission 2005). Since increasing
standoff distance between the building and the possibility of a car or truck bomb is the ultimate goal of
most physical site security interventions, security plans will first strive to see how far the building can be
removed from the street. Since buildings are difficult to move once situated, increasing the distance
between the street and the building can only be done by encroaching upon the street. Extending building
yards and sidewalks are possible solutions. So, too, is closing off the street in front of the building (as
discussed in the last section) and creating a security zone. In new construction, design standards call for
large setbacks and standoff distances.
The amount of standoff distance afforded between a building and the site perimeter determines
the extent and quality of physical interventions necessary to protect a site. There are different levels of
permeability of interventions as well as different
levels of element stability.
(Site proper"
Uine or Fence) Permeable Defenses
Planters, bollards, and benches create
barriers to large objects, but can be navigated by
pedestrians or people on bikes. Normal iterations
of these elements can be pushed aside or crushed
I First Layer t oDeense by swiftly moving vehicles; however, if secured
2 Secod Layer of Defenc
3 mrayer oDec properly, these elements can become just as
Figure 7. "Layers of Defense" from FEMA 430, 3-3 (2007). effective as walls. The Department of Defense 
has
Secure design will always endeavor to create maximum standoff published guidelines regarding the level of
distance. Site design begins with "2: Second Layer of Defense."
Note the defined perimeter and understanding of the interface protection offered by different elements and varying
between the first and second layers. methods of below grade securing mechanisms.
The first U.S. guidelines for crash-resistant barriers were published in 1985. Guidelines specified
different ratings for different levels of crash-resistance. Levels and ratings were based upon the degree to
which a test vehicle could penetrate the barrier at certain speeds and weights (i.e. the vehicle's kinetic
energy) (Stone Security Engineering 2009). A level 3 rating was the most secure, allowing vehicle
penetration of only three feet inside the perimeter.2 Level 2 allowed intrusion to twenty feet, and level 1
allowed intrusion of fifty feet (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2007, 4-10). Intrusion levels are
measured beginning with the front of the cargo bed of the vehicle. This is where explosives would be
kept.
In 2003 these ratings were revised and Levels 1 and 2 were dropped from the list of acceptable
intrusion. The "Level" designation was replaced with "Kinetic," or "K"-ratings. K ratings were based on
the speeds at which a 15,000 pound vehicle would have to be traveling to penetrate a barrier by three feet
(the initial "level 3").3
The calculated energies are given the following ratings (Concentric Security, LLC 2010):
K12 = 50 mph
K8 = 40 mph
K4 = 30 mph
The 'levels' still exist, as L1, L2, and L3, though they are no longer considered useful for higher level
security purposes. More recently, a new testing standard has emerged to create even more reliable K-
ratings, and K-ratings for barriers responding to different types of vehicles. This new test is called ASTM
F2656-07, the "standard Test Method for Vehicle Crash Testing of Perimeter Barriers." This standard
was created by the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) International in December 2007
(ASTM Standardization 2007).
Permeable defenses are often the most versatile interventions, and can be either active or passive
in nature (in other words, moving or unmoving). Bollards are truly the most versatile of perimeter security
devices. They can be decorative, echoing architectural detailing in the buildings they protect. They can
be made of concrete, steel, or other materials, and they can come in any height or heft imaginable. That
said, there are visual guidelines specified by FEMA 430 that are recommended for best integration into
the streetscape. Typically, bollards are no taller than thirty inches (the height at which normal office
desks stand), are spaced every three to four feet, and in long rows, are interspersed with other security
2 Level 3 was most applicable to urban environments, as few sites in downtowns have a setback greater than the
width of a sidewalk.
3 Kinetic energy can be calculated using the following equation:
KE = 1/2 x m x v2, where KE equals kinetic energy, m equals the mass of the vehicle, and v equals the vehicle's
velocity on impact.
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Figure 8. Streetscape Security Elements, from FEMA 430, 3-19 (2007).
Impermeable Defenses
Some impermeable defenses commonly used in urban environments are walls, terraces, raised
planting beds, and fences. Walls are difficult elements to place in urban settings. They can create
environments that are uncomfortable for the passerby, which can eventually diminish pedestrian activity
on streets. In the event of an explosion, walls (typically made of concrete) can fragment and split into
dangerous projectiles. As a result, designers often opt for shorter walls, which have the added benefit of
preserving sight lines.4
Opportunities for less urban or larger, urban campus situations include berms, excavations, and
ditches (or moats) are all types of barriers that can be constructed at the edge of a site. berms and ditches,
which often appear as more 'natural' and less threatening landscape elements (Federal Emergency
Management Agency 2007, 4-16). One particular type of ditch-berm-wall combination is known as the
ha-ha. The ha-ha was invented in 17th century England to prevent cattle from wandering up to a house,
while at the same time hiding the barrier to preserve the view. A ha-ha consists of a sheer drop-off, tall
enough to prevent livestock (or cars) from scaling it, and of a correspondingly tall mound, placed several
feet away from the drop-off. This creates the illusion that the drop-off does not exist, preserving a
viewshed and protecting an area from unwanted cattle (or motorists).
Another intervention useful at large urban sites is the tiger trap. This intervention is only useful in
areas accessible only to pedestrians and cyclists. Tiger traps are reinforced concrete holes covered by a
4 Sightlines will be explored in the chapter on CPTED in Action.
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elements or landscaping, and are
round and thin. However, bollards
can be creative elements in the
streetscape. Large boulders,
thickets of trees, or sculptural
elements can function in the same
ways as bollards, and can often
enhance the streetscape instead of
detract from it. Benches can be
reinforced with K-rated bollards.
surface that is capable of holding only a certain amount of weight. When a car or truck drives atop the
tiger trap, it falls into the reinforced concrete ditch below.
Table 3. How ATD Strategies can be fulfilled at the scale of the Site.
FEA46Anieris 3N isi ufle3a hssae
Deter Visible interventions, like bollards or walls, might deter potential
attackers.
Detect N/A
Deny K-rated interventions as well as inventions such as the ha-ha or tiger
tra are desi ned to sto terrorists.
Devalue N/A
ANTITERRORISM DESIGN FOR THE BUILDING
Antiterrorism design for buildings involves both visible and invisible strengthening. First,
building orientation should be inward. Buildings should 'look' inward on a site. Critical functions
should be relocated from lower floors to remove obvious targets. If possible, windows should be
removed from lower floors altogether. Where this is not possible, windows should be reinforced with
shatter-proof layers. The base of the building and outward structural elements should also be reinforced
in order to have a better opportunity of withstanding an explosion. Loading docks, garages, and lobbies
should be staffed by security personnel. The process of securing a lobby area with turnstiles, metal
detectors, and a sign-in sheet for visitors is also called lobby hardening. Electronic surveillance (CCTV)
should be used intensively (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2007, 223). Additionally, all
entryways should be well-lit at night in order to better detect possible intruders.
Table 4. How ATD Strategies can be fulfilled at the scale of the Building.
FNA 42 Anierrs 3oN isi 3ufle a hssae
Deter The hardened lobby area and presence of security is meant to deter.
Detect CCTV, security at all entryways, lighting for visibility of potential
aggressors at night are all designed to detect terrorists.
Deny Reinforced buildings, minimized ground floor windows, reinforced
windows, and inward facing buildings are designed to minimize
damage by explosives.
Devalue Removing critical functions from obvious places and removing
windows from the bottom floor seek to devalue buildin s.
CONCLUSION
As exemplified in this chapter, the ultimate goals of antiterrorism design are to deter, detect, and
deny terrorists, and to devalue critical buildings. The various scales of physical interventions that have
been conceived as the cannon of antiterrorism design endeavor to meet these goals. However, it seems
that the last goal, that of 'devaluing' properties, is difficult to meet given the highly visible nature of the
simultaneous goal of 'deterring.'
The next chapter will explore the history of place-based crime preventions. The chapter will end
with a description of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). Place-based crime
prevention and CPTED are relevant to the Antiterrorism Design history and principles discussed above;
however, the similarities and differences will not be revealed until later in the thesis.
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CHAPTER 3
HISTORY OF PLACE-BASED CRIME PREVENTION
Place-based crime prevention evolution and the creation of crime prevention through
environmental design (CPTED) are important to cultivating an understanding that design can influence
behavior and create safer environments. Tangential to this argument is that CPTED and other place-based
crime prevention strategies offer alternatives to militarization of environments in order to increase safety.
Place-based crime prevention strategies and CPTED function mainly through creating a readable design
aesthetic whereby it is easier for participants in an environment to cognitively infer appropriate and
inappropriate (or suspicious) behavior (in themselves and others) and react accordingly.
There are four basic elements to every crime event: a law that can be broken, an individual who
breaks that law, a target for the crime event (in the form of a victim or property), and a place where the
crime occurs (Brantingham and Brantingham 1981). Place-based or 'environmental' crime prevention is
concerned primarily with the fourth and most tangible
Law Offender of these dimensions: the physical location of the crime.
I IThere are several reasons to independently analyze the
I I role of environment in crime:'
Victim Place
Figure 9. Place-based crime chart.
1. Compared with the other elements of crime,
places are easy to analyze. While quality of a space
might be difficult to quantify, other details, such as
surrounding land use, presence of security cameras, or
distance to the next through-street are readily
measurable.
2. Since the 1800s there has been documented proof that some locations are more prone to crime
events than others (Cozens, Saville and Hillier 2005). These are known as 'hot spots.' A
geographic indicator for the likelihood of crime is apt to have a cause rooted in some type of
physical-spatial quality.
3. While the other elements of crime are commonly analyzed in the wake of an event (who did it,
who was harmed, what does the law say), place is normally overlooked. Location may be
mentioned, as in "this is the fourth mugging along Sinister Street this week," but it is uncommon
for commentary to consider how the actual physical environment may have contributed to the
crime.
It is important to note that place-based crime prevention techniques do not dismiss the importance of the other
dimensions of a crime event; in fact, all experts advocate for addressing other elements simultaneously.
The discipline known as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) acknowledges
the importance of place and design in crime events. The most widely-accepted premise of CPTED is that
"the proper design and effective use of the built environment can lead to a reduction in the incidence and
fear of crime-and to an increase in the quality of life" (Crowe 1991). CPTED presents its disciples with
a set of generalized design concepts, which, if crafted carefully to a specific location, will help alleviate
crime. The principles and premise behind CPTED evolved from several disciplines, institutes, and
decades of study. This chapter will chronologically explore the roots of modem CPTED, culminating
with an explanation and thorough discussion of the field as it exists today.
Jane Jacobs is credited with bringing attention to the requisites of safety in the urban environment. In
her seminal work, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, she wrote that
A city street equipped to handle strangers, and to make a safety asset, in itself, out of the
presence of strangers.. .must have three main qualities: First, there must be a clear
demarcation between what is public space and what is private space... Second, there must
be eyes upon the street, eyes belonging to those we might call the natural proprietors of
the street. The buildings on a street equipped to handle strangers.. .must be oriented to the
street.. .And third, the sidewalk must have users on it fairly continuously (Jacobs 1961,
35).
This passage and adjacent sections are commonly known as Jacobs' 'eyes on the street' theory. They
focus upon the idea of maintaining a critical mass of pedestrian traffic in a particular area. She
hypothesized that a busy place that people care about is more safe than a vacant place that 'turns its back'
to the street. Vibrant places are interesting to look at-Jacobs herself described her immersion as a
spectator in what she called "the sidewalk ballet." Essentially, in this passage, she identified three design
strategies for safety: obvious separation of public and private, buildings that face the street, and a critical
mass of pedestrian traffic. These three strategies would later come to be known, respectively, as
territoriality, natural surveillance, and milieu. She asserted that these strategies could be best achieved
through mixed land use, or maintaining "a substantial quantity of stores and other public places sprinkled
along the sidewalks of a district" which thrive alongside residences, and which open and close at different
hours of the day and night (Jacobs 1961, 36). This way, there are always people watching and being
watched-strangers inadvertently keeping one another safe.
After the publication of The Death and Life of Great American Cities, the academic community
published reactions to citizen advocacy and urban renewal as discussed in the book; a relative few reacted
by engaging in research on Jacobs' eyes on the street theories. A 1962 Journal of the American Planning
Association article considered pedestrian flow, and a 1967 article by Stanford M. Lyman and Marvin B.
Scott explored "Territoriality: A Neglected Sociological Dimension" (Morris and Zisman 1962). Perhaps
Jacobs' argument for the spatial dimensions of urban safety was devalued after Lewis Mumford's critique
of her work, which dismissed her interest in lively streets as "Mother Jacobs' Home Remedy for Urban
Cancer" (Mumford 1962).
In 1968, a graduate student at the University of California, Berkeley, took up the case again.
Shlomo Angel published a working paper that recognized the increasing rate of crime in American cities,
the paucity of data on the subject, and his confidence that responsible urban planning could help to curb
the problem (Angel 1968). Angel wrote about Jacobs' observations and coined his own term, 'critical
intensity zone,' which he used to describe the pedestrian density at which there are enough people in a
place to pique the interest of potential offenders, but not enough to "provide for an adequate surveillance
function" (Angel 1968, 17). Following this, Angel wrote (in a Lynchian way) about circulation and land
use:
It is fairly obvious that the form of urban environment affects the distribution and
circulation patterns of its inhabitants. People generally walk along sidewalks or streets
but seldom traverse blocks. People follow designated paths in parks and gardens; they
tend to wait for the bus at the bus station and not along its route; and, they enter their
homes through the front or back door. Changes in the design of the physical environment
will, therefore, affect their circulation behavior and the frequency of meeting and seeing
other people (17).
The remainder of his paper focused upon the creation of scenarios wherein he could manipulate
pedestrian density so as to pull it out of the critical intensity zone of crime (i.e. have enough pedestrians
for surveillance function), or to force the density so low so as to eliminate potential victims. Angel
indicated that he intended to achieve these effects through the creation of nodes of concentrated
businesses that function on a similar temporal axis, grouping compatible land uses, and by providing
more adequate parking.
Also significant to the Angel paper was his mention of a 1965 crime prevention piece by Peter P.
Lejins (Lejins 1965). At the 95th Annual Congress of Correction of the American Correction Association,
Lejins identified three categories of crime prevention. These included punitive, corrective, and
mechanical prevention. The latter of these three, mechanical prevention, could be achieved "by placing
obstacles in the way of potential offenders so that it becomes difficult or impossible for them to perpetrate
the offence," and no attempt is made "to influence his intention to commit an offense by threat of
punishment, nor is an attempt made to change his motivation" (Lejins 1965, 148). This concept later
became increasingly important to practitioners in the world of environmental crime prevention. Of
particular note is the stress that subsequent authors place on the difference between motivation for a
criminal action and opportunity for a criminal action. While it is possible that environmental techniques
will foil directed, motivated crime, they are even more likely to prevent the opportunity of crime, thus
thwarting crimes of convenience or impulse.2
In the 1970s the director of the Institute of Planning and Housing at New York University, Oscar
Newman, was awarded funding to research public housing in New York by the National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the U.S. Department of Justice (Newman, Defensible Space: Crime
Prevention Through Urban Design 1972, ix). Through a number of studies, Newman was able to prove
that the architecture of public housing influenced human behavior and the incidence of crime at a given
site. As a result of his research, Newman created several principles he believed were vital to the creation
of healthy behavior around public housing:
* Territoriality involves the importance of subdividing a property into zones for 'managers' in
order to bestow a sense of ownership.
" Surveillance refers to the ability to view all public areas.
" Boundary definition speaks to the need to make clear transitions from public areas to private ones.
* Image recognized that cognitive association also plays a role, asserting that external perception
from a viewer influences actual experience of a space. In other words, architecture should be
sensitive to the fact that there is stigma involved with public housing, and should strive to create
more humane forms.
" Milieu harkens back to the concerns of both Jane Jacobs and Shlomo Angel. Newman cautioned
that selecting a site for a new development is important, since placing a project in a safe
neighborhood will allow the managers to build off existing security conditions. Complementary
land uses are vital (Newman, Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design 1972).
Newman's conclusions opened new worlds for the fields of crime prevention, architecture, and planning.
They contained the potential to give power back to the people who lived in housing projects. As one
writer pointed out,
the attractiveness of Newman's ideas was that.. .his main aim was to find ways of
changing the underlying structure of the environment so that it would not attract criminal
behavior, and that it would enable residents to control access to their homes and the use
of surrounding areas (Poyner 1983, 10).
The legacy of Newman's first work is such that even urban planners, notorious for their indifference to
CPTED and environmental criminology, can identify the main concepts of Defensible Space and recall its
importance to the new era of American public housing.
Newman's book on the subject was called Defensible Space: Crime Prevention through Urban
Design. Strangely enough, a book published one year earlier had a similar title. C. Ray Jeffery, a
criminologist, wrote about using the physical environment to influence potential criminal behavior. In
this predecessor to modern CPTED, Jeffery's 1971 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
2 This distinction will become more important later in this paper, where I explore the intersections between
designing for public safety and designing for antiterrorism.
argued that attempting to rehabilitate individual criminals through the positive school of criminology (the
trend at the time) was a dismal failure. He believed that programs that sought to reduce crime through
efforts aimed at poverty reduction were on the wrong path. Certain populations (like the poor) were not
more likely to commit crimes; certain environments were more likely to provide the opportunities to
commit them. He felt that, to reduce future incidents of crime, there needed to be new forms of
behavioral research, and that this research should inform changes in the environment.
Jeffery's and Newman's works were well-received by both the planning and criminology fields.
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Defensible Space became respected concepts. A
CPTED Demonstration Program directed by the Westinghouse National Issues Center (through the
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice) emerged to evaluate CPTED principles in
real life situations. The four year study (1974-78) observed several case studies and produced a work
called The CPTED Compendium (Vito, Maahs and Holmes 2007, 72). During this time, Jeffery re-worked
his 1971 book, ultimately creating a more useful guide with specific examples, details, and suggestions as
to how various professionals might take part in crime prevention (Jeffery 1977).
Even though Jeffrey coined the term and inspired initial studies, his work is generally considered
part of the field of environmental criminology, rather than explicitly a part of modern CPTED.
Environmental criminology "argues that some places are much more vulnerable than others and criminal
events will tend to occur frequently at such places" (Herbert and Hyde 1985, 261). Environmental
criminology differs from CPTED in its continued focus on psychology and behavioral studies in addition
to its geographical context. One writer stated that CPTED "does not purport to develop crime prevention
solutions in a broad universe of human behavior but rather solutions limited to variables that can be
manipulated and evaluated in the specified man/environment relationship" (T. Crowe 1991, 29). In
contrast, in Brantingham and Brantingham's seminal piece Environmental Criminology, the authors state
that "Environmental criminologists set out to use the geographic imagination in concert with the
sociological imagination to describe, understand, and control criminal events" (Brantingham and
Brantingham 1981, 21). There are three key theories within environmental criminology, which include
pattern theory by the Brantinghams, routine activity theory by Marcus Felson and rational choice theory
by Ronald V. Clarke. Pattern theory involves the concept that neither crime nor criminal opportunity is
random, and that everyone, including criminals (those who form crime templates), have normal spatial-
temporal patterns (Brantingham and Brantingham 2009). Routine activity theory purports that three things
must be happening at the same time and place (a target must be available, a guardian of the target must be
absent, and a motivated offender must be present) (U.K. Home Office 2003). Rational choice theory
purports that criminals seek to benefit from their actions, and therefore must use some type of cost-benefit
analysis when considering criminal acts (U.K. Home Office 2004).
The solidification of the field of environmental criminology rolled easily into the advent of
situational crime prevention. Situational crime prevention owed its philosophy partially to environmental
criminology, but veered from this discipline with research into community-police networks working
together to protect neighborhoods. Situational crime prevention strongly advocated for citizen
participation, citizen-police cooperation
and relationships, and neighborhood
Territoriality maintenance. In 1982 George L. Kelling
and James Q. Wilson published the
Activity Surveillance defining piece of this movement: an
Support article entitled "Broken Windows" in The
Atlantic Monthly (Kelling and Wilson
1982). The article was informed by two
major sources. First was Kelling's
experience on 'foot patrol' (as a cop
walking a neighborhood beat) in a
/mainge C l Newark, New Jersey neighborhood. The
second was a study by psychologist Philip
Zimbardo. From these, Kelling and
Wilson constructed a theory of the need
Figure 10. CPTED chart as adapted from Moffat, 1983 for "order-maintenance" in communities.(Cozens, Saville and Hillier 2005)
The shorthand for their philosophy was
"Broken Windows," named as a result of the general consensus among social psychologists and police
officers that, once one window is broken and left untended, more broken windows will follow. This
results from the general feeling that a broken window projects an air of neglect, and, since 'no one cares,'
vandalism will ensue. Essentially, unchecked disorder begets still more disorder.
This mandate of maintenance from situational crime prevention only served to underscore
Newman's principle of territoriality. In 1988, the director of the National Crime Prevention Institute,
Timothy Crowe, penned an article synthesizing principles learned from Defensible Space, environmental
criminology, and situational crime prevention. The combination of these fields and practices he called
CPTED. The six-page piece explained basic principles and contained clear diagrams showing good and
bad design (T. Crowe 1988). Crowe followed this up with a much more extensive book in 1991. The
book, written in a conversational tone for a broad audience, implored the reader to look at the surrounding
environment in different ways. CPTED is not presented as an academic field or specialized design
regimen, but rather as good old-fashioned common sense. CPTED is deliberately non-threatening, both in
approach and philosophy (T. Crowe 1991).
Crowe calls for a 'three 'D' strategy,' stating that all one needs to remember is 'Designation,
Definition, and Design.' This is a device to help users remember the main principles of CPTED: natural
surveillance, natural access control, territorial reinforcement, activity support, and maintenance and
management. As indicated earlier, these principles are a combination of imperatives from the disciplines
that led to CPTED, with a heavy emphasis on Oscar Newman's Defensible Space theories. Note, though,
the stress on the term 'natural.' The 'natural' is about spatial definition and integrative design rather than
more 'mechanical' or 'organized' methods, which require things like locks and guards.
To fulfill the main CPTED principles, Crowe suggests specialized employment of nine strategies:
1. Provide clear border definition of controlled space.
2. Provide clearly marked transitional zones.
3. Relocate gathering areas.
4. Place safe activities in unsafe locations.
5. Place unsafe activities in safe locations.
6. Re-designate the use of space to provide natural barriers.
7. Improve scheduling of space.
8. Redesign or revamp space to increase the perception of natural surveillance.
9. Overcome distance and isolation.
Crowe provides general examples of each of these strategies, and later provides a number of diagrams of
"poor" and "good" site plan examples of everything from parking lots to pedestrian plazas to schools. (T.
Crowe 1991, 106).
This founding work established CPTED as a worthwhile process and is now known as "first
generation CPTED." In the late nineties a "second generation" CPTED began to evolve, with a more
directed focus at community building than simply the built environment. However, even community
building has physical aspects. In Saville and Cleveland's piece on second generation CPTED, they
identified elements of a Dutch CPTED plan that they considered progressive. These elements included
* The necessity of human-scale development
* The importance of urban meeting places
* Establishment of youth clubs
* Engaging residents in order to procure participatory support and encourage responsibility
regarding maintenance and upkeep.(Saville and Cleveland 1997).
As of a publication in 2003, the authors condensed these concepts into four phrases: neighborhood
capacity, community culture, cohesion, and connectivity (Saville and Cleveland, An introduction to 2nd
Generation CPTED 2003).
As I will discuss later in this thesis, this newest version of CPTED is extremely meaningful when
put in the context of ATD in urban downtowns. I will attempt to advance thoughts on these four Dutch
elements in my discussion of the need for Civic Design principles within all CPTED/ATD strategies.
CPTED CRITICS AND LIMITATIONS
As with all crime prevention strategies, CPTED has its limitations, and is meant to be used in
conjunction with other tactics. The process has been criticized largely for its displacement effects-a
tendency to simply move crime from one place to another. A book by Hakim and Rengert asserts that
crime can be displaced in five dimensions: location, time, tactics, targets and type of crime (Hakim and
Rengert 1981). CPTED practitioners, however, maintain that displacement is a result of all crime
prevention strategies, and that CPTED's failings in this regard are not unique. In fact, difficulties
attributed to other crime prevention strategies can be attributed to CPTED as well: an inability to deflect
irrational offenders (those that are intoxicated), and difficulty maintaining safety in areas that are largely
vacant.
A criticism more unique to CPTED, however, is that criminals can use the same principles to
create their own territories, or "offensible space" (Atlas 1991). Additionally, CPTED is sometimes
blamed for creating fortressing affects on communities and sites, but fortressing, while a concept in early
CPTED iterations, has been roundly denounced in modem evolutions. Fortressing or target hardening
tends to force people behind walls and out of public space, frightening residents and peeling eyes away
from the streets (Cozens, Saville and Hillier 2005).
CONCLUSION
As Timothy Crowe writes in his book, "CPTED is a process and not a belief system." Crowe, as
well as his predecessors, allowed the field to have room to evolve and refine its principles. As described
by contemporary scholars, CPTED has evolved into a more community-oriented process. While this
evolution is admirable, it is worth noting that CPTED was conceived of as necessitating community
interaction even at its onset, as situational crime preventions remains one of the pillars upon which it was
created.
This history of CPTED and an understanding of its evolution is vital to supporting the central
argument of this thesis: that CPTED is capable of demilitarizing antiterrorism design and making it more
philosophically acceptable in an open civilian society and more physically acceptable in American
downtowns.
CHAPTER 4:
CPTED IN ACTION
As examined in the evolution of place-based crime prevention, CPTED evolved from several
disciplines all concerned with the impact of design on behavior. CPTED strives to control five elements
(natural surveillance, territoriality, activity support, maintenance, and access control) in order to create an
environment less prone to criminal activity. These elements ultimately help users to better understand
appropriate and inappropriate behaviors in a space. According to Timothy Crowe, there are nine basic
principles that aid in the implementation of CPTED. They are again presented here, and supplemented by
a tenth, important principle:
1. Clear border definition of controlled space.
2. Provide clearly marked transitional zones.
3. Relocation of gathering areas.
4. Place safe activities in unsafe locations.
5. Place unsafe activities in safe locations.
6. Re-designate the use of space to provide natural barriers.
7. Improve scheduling of space.
8. Redesign or revamp space to increase the perception of natural surveillance.
9. Overcome distance and isolation.
10. Ensure that the space is maintained.
These principles can be adhered to at different urban scales by employing various strategies.
Since this thesis is particularly concerned with urban downtowns, only four scales will be analyzed: the
scale of the Central Business District, the scale of the grid within the Central Business District (the streets
and blocks within the downtown), the scale of the business campus or site (where one entity clearly
defines territory), and the scale of a target building.
Scale of the downtown Scale of the grid: streets and intra-blocks Scale of the site/inter-block Scale of the building
Figure 11. Scales of Downtown. These images indicate the corresponding scale of the intervention mentioned below.
The principles articulated above will be revisited as each scale is examined. This will provide an
opportunity to understand how CPTED design strategies align with CPTED design goals.
CPTED DOWNTOWN
Implementing CPTED on an urban downtown scale necessitates the enforcement of two relevant
design criteria: ensuring mixed land uses and encouraging complementary diverse hours of operation are
essential strategies. Ensuring mixed uses in an urban downtown is a concept that harkens back to the
studies of Jane Jacobs. Mixed use ensures symbiotic relationships and promotes round-the-clock use.
Mixed use implies that there will always be people in the district-whether they be there to shop, do
business, eat, or sleep. Consistent inflow and outflow of people ensures eyes on the street. Residents, in
particular, will be likely to 'defend' the district and look out for one another. They will be quick to call in
issues regarding maintenance and they will be more aware of unusual behavior.
Considering issues related to time of operation is crucial. If all commercial and consumer
interests in a downtown close at the same time, the area becomes isolated and desolate for those who have
to frequent the district after hours. Business people working late, night workers, and residents of the area
are at risk. If uses that stagger hours are promoted, though, there is guaranteed to be a certain population
within the district at all times. Another option is to cluster operations that all serve patrons who keep later
hours. This will concentrate activity in one node, and ensure that individuals do not have to travel far to
get the things that they need. Concentrating uses of similar operation hours enables the district to avoid
Shlomo Angel's 'critical density' of criminal activity (enough people to be victims but not enough people
to witness and intervene in the assault). People will recognize these nodes as more secure, and will
gravitate toward them, supporting critical densities of activity.
Table 5. How CPTED Strategies can be fulfilled at the scale of the Downtown.
1. Clear border definition of controlled space. N/A
2. Provide clearly marked transitional zones. N/A
3. Relocation of gathering areas. Clustering uses with similar hours of operation
4. Place safe activities in unsafe locations. N/A
5. Place unsafe activities in safe locations. Clustering uses with similar hours of operation
(alone, these uses may become marginal and used
only by individuals comfortable with braving the
city at night)
6. Redesignate the use of space to provide N/A
natural barriers.
7. Improve scheduling of space. Mixed use development and clustering uses with
similar hours of operation will diversify scheduling
8. Redesign or revamp space to increase the Mixed use development and clustering uses with
perception of natural surveillance. similar hours of operation increases the users at any
time of day, increasing perception of natural
surveillance
9. Overcome distance and isolation. Mixed use development encourages a livelier city,
and clustering uses ensures users do not need to
travel far to reach their next destination.
10. Ensure that the space is maintained. Mixed use indicates that there will be residents and
store owners in the area. These people have
incentive to take ownership of the district and
ensure maintenance needs are met.
CPTED FOR THE GRID
At the inter-block and street level, CPTED gives particular weight to concerns about wayfinding,
movement predictors, and clear sightlines. Streets, walkways, and pedestrian tunnels are valuable parts of
the grid's public environment. However, it is possible that glaring safety issues can escape the notice of
urban design professionals who have not learned to consider basic crime prevention theories.
ON LOCATION: MOVEMENT PREDICTORS
Figure 12. Photographs by Sara Rothrock.
Above: Pedestrian pathway around One Police Plaza in New York City. Note visual permeability with
iron fencing, but lack of mirror to improve sightlines around corner. Notice man at bottom of stairs give
the corner a wide berth-an instinctive safety measure.
Figure 13. Photographs by Sara Rothrock.
Above: The pedestrian walkway behind TD Bank Garden in Boston. This movement predictor offers
visual permeability with its chain link fence, and good sightlines (note how easy it is to see around curves
in the middle picture). However, the graffiti on the sign in the last picture does not inspire confidence
regarding other users of the space or how well the walkway is patrolled by police.
To ensure safety on streets, users should have access to obvious wayfinding systems. A
wayfinding system can be as simple as a map of the area, or interspersed signs that direct users in a
specific direction toward points of interest. Wayfinding is a safety element because it allows pedestrians
to move directly to a desired location. Lost and wandering tourists and district visitors make easy targets
for criminals. A wayfinding system allows pedestrians to be less vulnerable and more knowledgeable
about their surroundings (T. Crowe 1991).
Movement predictors are of particular concern in urban environments. Movement predictors are
linear paths designed in such a way that pedestrians are funneled in a predictable direction. As a result,
pedestrians are not given the opportunity to flee in an unpredictable direction when faced with an
aggressor. Pedestrian walkways and tunnels are common types of movement vectors. So, too, are streets
that extend for multiple blocks without through-ways (like alleys). Movement predictors are often
interspersed with 'entrapment spots,' which are usually alcoves designed to provide relief from the
relentless linearity of the vector. Unfortunately, entrapment spots provide the opportunity for aggressors
hide and wait, out of sight, and prepare to assault unsuspecting passersby (Planning and Development
Department of the City of Toronto 1992).
Movement vectors cannot easily be altered once established in an urban area. However, they can
be mitigated by allowing for clear sightlines and visual permeability of barriers (Planning and
Development Department of the City of Toronto 1992). A sightline is a device that establishes how far
along a path an individual can see. When a movement predictor bends to the side, the pedestrian does not
know what could be waiting just out of sight. To improve the sightline, a mirror can be installed at the
corner. A mirror will allow those beyond the bend to see approaching figures. Additionally, visual
permeability can be built into a movement predictor by allowing pedestrians to be able to see through
barriers on either side. For example, if pedestrians are shuttled through a fenced walkway, the fences
should be wrought iron or chain link to provide a view beyond the pathway. Entrapment areas in
movement vectors should be sealed off at night.
Table 6. How CPTED Strategies can be fulfilled at the scale of the Grid.
1. Clear border definition of controlled space. N/A
2. Provide clearly marked transitional zones. N/A
3. Relocation of gathering areas. N/A
4. Place safe activities in unsafe locations. Mitigation technique for entrapment areas
5. Place unsafe activities in safe locations. N/A
6. Redesignate the use of space to provide N/A
natural barriers.
7. Improve scheduling of space. Entrapment areas should be capable of closing at
night
8. Redesign or revamp space to increase the Increase visual permeability throughout movement
perception of natural surveillance. predictors to see out and see in
9. Overcome distance and isolation. Wayfinding systems should be installed to help
individuals identify nearby points of interest that
will be more densely populated.
10. Ensure maintenance for the site. N/A
CPTED AT THE SITE
The site level of the urban environment involves the sidewalk and building yard surrounding a
building. Design at this level is largely under the control of the private interests invested in the building or
companies within the building.
Changes on public sidewalks will
necessitate public approval, but
changes in the building yard or
other accompanying space are
private domain.
To effectively incorporate
CPTED into a design, the designer
public semi-Pumic Semi-private rI vate must first establish a zone of
influence around a property, using
Figure 14. How public is this space? Source: Atlas, 21 Century Security, a 'hierarchy of transition.' In
p. 58(2008).
other words, a site designer
should be able to design the site in such a way that it alerts pedestrians as to the degree of publicness of a
particular area (Newman, Design Guidelines for Creating Defensible Space 1976). To do this, CPTED
promotes using natural or 'symbolic' barriers, like shrubs, changes in grade, paving texture, and light
standards to alert pedestrians that they are entering a new zone (T. Crowe 1991). These are used to subtly
inform an individual that she or he is moving from a public space to a semi private space to a private area.
Amenities and signs can also serve as symbolic barriers to delimit a hierarchy of privacy. They
make it clear who belongs where and for what purpose. Often the public is invited into the semiprivate
plaza of an office complex in urban areas. Providing amenities in these areas (like bathrooms, benches,
and vendors) alerts pedestrians that they are welcome in what otherwise might seem like a private area.
Open public space, such as office plazas, green spaces, or parks, is in particular need of clear
delineation. "Well-designed and clearly allocated recreation facilities improve the security of an area by
creating outdoor extensions of the dwelling unit that residents can identify and control. Distant and
undefined recreation and green facilities, whose intended users are unclear, often go unused or are
vandalized" (Newman 1976, 112). Without clear notice of rules at a site, the site can become
marginalized.
Promoting activity in a public space is particularly important. William Whyte, the father of
public space studies, built his career around learning what makes public spaces active. In the 1960s he
was commissioned by the Municipal Art Society and the New York City Planning Department to
ascertain why some of New York's privately-owned public spaces were more popular than others. His
findings included generalizations about indicators for good public space (people stopping in the middle of
crowds to talk, kissing in public) and what, in all likelihood, creates a good public space in the first place
(plenty of seating, water features) (Whyte 1988).
Lighting is also an important aspect of CPTED. At night, strategic lighting creates a path for site
users. It does this job indiscriminately-it lights the way for an individual to see where he or she is
stepping, but it also affords hidden assailants a view of where you are. As a result of this effect, lighting
can lead to a false sense of confidence in unsafe places. The best argument for improved nighttime
lighting advocates for an individual to be able to identify the face of a person fifty feet away. "The ability
to have eye contact with a person you are about to pass at a reasonable "flight" distance is a common
measure of security" (Planning and Development Department of the City of Toronto 1992). This type of
light is good. But, like too little lighting, too much lighting can be bad. Security lights outside doorways
are often too harsh. This harshness temporarily blinds the viewer, and an assailant could easily be
cloaked in darkness immediately beside it (which your eyes, trying to account for the security light, would
not be able to detect). In other words, "the lighting glares towards the person approaching, making it
impossible to see that person" (Planning and Development Department of the City of Toronto 1992, 12).
Light is a powerful tool, and lighting schemes should be designed carefully to enhance the site and
improve safety.
Table 7. How CPTED Strategies can be fulfilled at the scale of the Site.
1. Clear border definition of controlled space. Transition hierarchies on all sites to determine difference
between public, quasi public, semi private, and private
space
2. Provide clearly marked transitional zones. Pavement pattern, landscaping, street furniture
3. Relocation of gathering areas. N/A
4. Place safe activities in unsafe locations. N/A
5. Place unsafe activities in safe locations. N/A
6. Redesignate the use of space to provide natural If there was a stream on the property, they could use it.
barriers.
7. Improve scheduling of space. N/A
8. Redesign or revamp space to increase the Activity control and promotion of milieu in public space.
perception of natural surveillance.
9. Overcome distance and isolation. Make public spaces and sites interesting places to be.
10. Ensure maintenance at the site. N/A
CPTED FOR THE BUILDING
CPTED for buildings in urban environments involves building orientation, opportunities for
windows, proper lighting, close-circuit television (CCTV) for surveillance, and hardened lobbies.
Building should always face out toward the street. Directing the 'gaze' of the building in this manner
allows for increased surveillance of building users from windows. The lower floor should have windows
for clear sightlines from the sidewalk into the building and vice versa. A lighting designer should
strategically place lamps in vulnerable areas so as to increase the visibility of potential aggressors.
CCTVs should be used, and placed on the building in a way that entrances and exits are monitored.
CCTV is most effective at preventing crime when it is visible, so care should be taken to provide a sign to
let users know that they are being monitored. Lastly, lobbies can be hardened with turnstiles, security,
and sign-in sheets in order to deter potential criminals from entering the building.
Table 8. How CPTED Strategies can be fulfilled at the scale of the Building.
1. Clear border definition of controlled space. Hardened lobbies and the indication of security
cameras delineate that the user is moving into
private space.
2. Provide clearly marked transitional zones. Hardened lobbies and the indication of security
cameras delineate that the user is moving into
private space.
3. Relocation of gathering areas. The hardened lobby is no longer appropriate for
gathering; rather, it is a place to proceed through.
4. Place safe activities in unsafe locations. Entrances and exits should be strategically lit.
5. Place unsafe activities in safe locations. N/A
6. Redesignate the use of space to provide N/A
natural barriers.
7. Improve scheduling of space. N/A
8. Redesign or revamp space to increase the Transparency at the ground level and orienting
perception of natural surveillance. buildings outward will increase natural
surveillance.
9. Overcome distance and isolation. Windows at the ground level will help to create
interaction between inside and outside uses,
allowing for mutual surveillance.
10. Ensure maintenance at the site. Security cameras will aid in indicating when
something is in need of repair.
As described in this section, the goals of CPTED are to increase natural surveillance,
territoriality, activity support, maintenance, and access control. These can be achieved by implementing
ten principles at each urban scale. In Chapter 5, I will use the analysis from this segment as well as
"Antiterrorism Design in Action" in order to examine the synergies and discontinuities between CPTED
and antiterrorism design.
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EXHIBIT
ANTITERRORISM DESIGN AND CPTED: SYNERGIES AND DISCREPANCIES
In the following pages you will find a chart of elements and strategies as described in the proceeding
chapters. The chart provides guidance as to whether each identified strategy or element can be
compatible with both Antiterrorism Design and CPTED, and to what degree. In general, most strategies
and design elements are complementary, and the way they are used on a site can be directed to
simultaneously achieve the goals of each. However, a few design elements and strategies are
fundamentally incompatible unless dramatically retrofitted or redesigned. These are of particular interest,
as they highlight that while ATD and CPTED can be complementary, this will not always be the case.
Table 9. Chart of CPTED and AT desi.. elements and strate ies
Elemenit Description CPTED purpose AT purpose Interaction
/Optimizationi
Bollard Singular element symbolic barrier Provides a degree Place K-rated bollards
that can be grouped allowing for visual of perimeter along transitional
to form a kind of permeability security that can zones. Select a bollard
fence that is (preserving sight be reinforced to style that enhances
permeable to lines) to define a achieve a K-rating neighborhood aesthetic.
pedestrians and zone of influence thatincreases
cyclists. Initially in a hierarchy of effective standoff
used at wharves as transitional spaces, distance
poles to tie boats to protects
pedestrians from
cars. Bollard type
can show
neighborhood
ownership.
Planter Element (usually ("69 also provides an ... Place K-rated planters
rectangular or opportunity to along transitional
circular) that acts show ownership, zones, and ensure that
like a very large community plantings are
flower box or pot maintenance, and maintained and
neighborhood reflective of the
identity though neighborhood character.
accompanying
plantings
Fence Continuous thin .. P Visual Can be reinforced Use fences sparingly-
screen wrapped permeability with electric they are not as stable as
around a site (or dependent upon current and bollards and planters,
portion thereof) type of fence underground and impassibility can
concrete to create perverse
increase standoff incentives to trespass.
distance
Moat Artificially-created .a if 'traditional,' Increases standoff Use moat and water
circular chasm provides water distance feature to define a zone
surrounding site. feature as incentive of influence. Caution
May or may not for increased that the moat does not
have water. activity become a movement
predictor.
Grade Change in level of symbolic barrier Could prevent Caution to preserve
change ground, ha-ha allowing for visual direct access to a sight lines, otherwise
included permeability to site, increasing a has potential as a good
define a zone of potential bomb element.
influence in a blast radius
hierarchy of
transitional spaces
Tiger Trap A collapsible Provides security Tiger trap does not
sidewalk with a pit by way of interfere with CPTED
beneath and trapping terrorists elements, affords AT
reinforced holding in cars or trucks. protection.
chamber
Hardened Screening process in Real barrier to Screen for As long as the
lobby building lobby that define a private terrorists screening process is not
may involve zone, screens for overly threatening,
turnstiles and a sign- individuals who hardened lobbies are
in desk. are not supposed to compatible with both
be there ATD and CPTED.
Movement Funnels pedestrians Poor design that Good, it ensures DIVERGENCE
Predictor along a specific must be changed. people are
linear route moving the
desired direction.
People who do
not follow are
threats.
Target Securing the outside Debated whether Preferable. Any DIVERGENCE
Hardening/ of a building in a this is akin to degree of visual
Fortressing visual way so as to CPTED or only indication of
indicate the presence tangentially increased security
of threat prevention related. More will act as a
technologies recent texts deterrent to
disparage target terrorist groups,
hardening in favor which will want
of more 'natural' to use limited
techniques and less resources in the
posturing. Thought most effective
to taunt offenders, way (i.e. pursuing
a target that will
certainly be
impacted)
Building How building is Building should Building should DIVERGENCE
orientation positioned in face the street to be oriented
relation to the street created maximum inward (especially
opportunity for in circumstances
natural without sufficient
surveillance setbacks) to avoid
attacks from the
direction of street
Windows How many Windows should Limit the number DIVERGENCE
windows, where be placed as of windows of
frequently as is each building and
aesthetically remove windows
pleasing so as to at street level.
create maximum Windows are less
opportunity for structurally sound
natural than solid wall,
surveillance. and are more
Windows at street likely to burst in
level especially an explosion.
important for
urban buildings to
support sight lines
and create inviting
pedestrian
through-ways
Sidewalk Increasing the width Creates a more Increases setback Increase sidewalk width
width of the sidewalk inviting street distance where possible.
increase environment for
more pedestrian
action
Active Retractable bollards, Provides a way to Closing alleyways Install active barriers in
barriers for fences, other active improve to all but pre- entrapment areas and
alleys and barriers in front of scheduling of screened alleyways.
other alleyways and spaces- deliveries
enclosure enclosure areas entrapment areas increases setback
areas should be closed at distance in
night and made alleyways where
unattractive to buildings are
pedestrians always
immediately next
to the street
High Planter immediately While it provides a The higher the Some divergence. A
planters next to building, delineation of better, acts as a compromise involves
flush waist-height or taller public and semi- blast deflector and medium-height baadeers
against public space, it increases setback that provide amenities
building removes the ability distance. to encourage public
side to see in and out of interaction with space.
the lower levels of Ornate benches or
the building, medium-height planters
removing another immediately below
layer of windows.
surveillance.
Plazas Open areas between Plazas can be Increases setback. Ensure that plazas are
the building and the detrimental to maintained and they
sidewalk CPTED if poorly will be an asset to
maintained and CPTED and ATD.
accessorized, but if
outfitted well can
be assets that serve
to attract people
and increase
natural
surveillance and
better delineate
between public and
private space.
Control Used to screen Used to screen The 'hardened lobby'
Booth visitors either at the visitors to of the parking garage.
entrance to the site intimidate and This is compatible with
or in the lobby identify possible both design aesthetics
aggressors so long as it is not too
threatening.
Signage Including Wayfinding is Clear Signage should be
wayfinding, area exceptionally identification of promoted.
delineation, or important for behavior
specific directions CPTED, as is clear acceptable in
(i.e. parking control, identification of specific areas
restriction, areas for certain allows for easier
designation) activities, screening of
people in the area
and identification
of potential
terrorists or
aggressors
Limited Allowing only one One entrance is Preferable to Allow for limited
entryways entrance and exit so acceptable, but better screen for entryways but multiple
as to screen building blocking exits is terrorists. exits.
users impermissible due
to fire safety or
otherpissues.
Security No Man's lands Impermissible. Good. Enhances DIVERGENCE
Zones around important Removes eyes setback and the
buildings from the street, fewer people the
flirts with Shlomo better.
Angel's critical
densities.
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CHAPTER 5
BOSTON AND NEW YORK: ON LOCATION
In this chapter, actual antiterrorism design and CPTED processes will be analyzed in two urban
environments: New York and Boston. This chapter will explore the government agencies, documents, and
historical motivations of both design paradigms in these cities. There are a number of reasons why these
two cities were selected as case studies for this research.
Both New York and Boston are major centers of economic and historic importance on the
Northeastern coast of the United States. Both are noted tourist hubs with celebrated downtowns, and both
were scrutinized following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Additionally, these cities were
chosen as a result my previous knowledge resulting from work with M.I.T. Lecturer in urban design and
planning, Susan Silberberg-Robinson, whose research focused on changes in public space post-9/1 1.
The information-gathering process for this chapter was enlightening. The original intention of this
thesis research was to provide insight into site design decision-making processes of various public and
private building owners in New York and Boston. However, it quickly became apparent that discussing
even visible site security elements was problematic. In an attempt to retrieve information about one
federal building in Boston, the building manager answered a few questions, then abruptly ended the
conversation, saying "I can't speak with you about this." Attempts to continue the conversation were met
with a request that I speak with someone 'higher up,' who did not return my phone calls. It should be
noted that it was not my intention to ask questions about anything but immediately visible security
interventions. Nor did I ask specifics regarding K-ratings or threat assessments. The experience
illuminated the challenges of researching urban security interventions, and informed my choice to focus
instead upon city policy and process.
NEW YORK AND BOSTON: EXCEPTIONALLY BRIEF INTRODUCTIONS
Boston was established as a town in 1630,
and was the setting for the Boston
Boston
Massacre and the Boston Tea Party. It was
also the place where George Washington
first took command of troops at the onset
of the American Revolutionary War (City
of Boston 2010). As a result, one of
Boston's many nicknames is "The Cradle
Figure 15. Map showing location of Boston and NYC. Created by the author.
of Liberty." As history progressed and Boston continued to grow economically and academically
powerful, it became known as "The Hub of the Universe" (Dalager 2010). Boston is now home to over
600,000 people (U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey 2006-2008), over 35 universities
(BostonEducation.org 2006), and more than 20 hospitals and medical centers (Capuano 2010). It is
estimated that the city hosts over twelve million national and international visitors each year (City of
Boston 2010). Boston's most modern moniker is "The Walking City," which is a tribute to the proximity
of neighborhoods, safety of the city streets, and quality of Boston's public space (Dalager 2010).
Celebrated public spaces include Boston Common, the Public Garden, and Post Office Square.
New York City, originally New Amsterdam, was established by the Dutch West India Company
five years before Boston, in 1625 (New York Times Editorial Board 2008). As early as 1800, New York
City became a place for diverse immigrant groups to settle, and in 1892 Ellis Island was officially
designated as the location where all new arrivals would be processed (National Park Service 2008).
Another New York landmark, the Statue of Liberty, was erected six years later (National Park Service
2010). New York City grew quickly to become the premiere American cultural and financial city. Today,
New York City is home to over eight million people (U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey
2006-2008), countless entertainment and cultural institutions, and a world-renowned financial center.
Perhaps equally well known are the city's public spaces and bustling city streets. Famous public spaces
include Central Park, Times Square, and the New York Public Library. Over twenty-six million people
visit New York City annually (Project for Public Spaces 2003).
HISTORY OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY
As a result of New York City's prominent position on the national stage, as well as its myriad
cultural and economic landmarks, it has become a target of terrorist attacks. While Boston is also .
historically and culturally significant, it has fewer landmarks, is less densely populated, and has not been
a target of any successful attack. The history of terrorism in New York and Boston is instructive, and
helps to explain the divergent antiterrorism design processes of the two cities.
As mentioned in the antiterrorism design history chapter, in 1910, New York City's Wall Street
was the site of one of the first terrorist attacks in U.S. history. Between 1910 and 1950 there were
extremely isolated incidents of terrorism, and in the 1950s Washington, D.C. became the locus of terrorist
interest. It was not until the 1970s that New York was threatened again, and Boston threatened for the
first time.
In 1974 American cities began to receive bomb threats. The first was a nuclear bomb threat from
an unidentified party in Boston, and the second was from a seemingly well-informed group in New York
City. The threats, which both turned out to be hoaxes, asked for various sums of money from the U.S.
government. A year later, many militant groups associated with the Palestinian movement began to
exhibit hostile tendencies. A bomb exploded at New York's La Guardia Airport in Queens, NY. A caller
took responsibility for the attack in the name of the Palestinian Liberation Operation (PLO); however, the
PLO denied association. The next year, in 1976, Croat nationals placed a bomb in Grand Central
Terminal in New York City. The NYC Police Department (NYPD) was unable to disarm the bomb in
time, and one officer died. Additionally, during this period, the FALN, Puerto Rican National Liberation
Armed Forces, set off bombs in Manhattan (Naftali 2005).
On February 26, 1993, the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City was attacked for the
first time when a bomb exploded in the public parking lot beneath the building. Six people died, a
thousand suffered injuries mostly due to smoke inhalation, and the WTC was left with over $500 million
in property damages (Anti-Defamation League 2005). A Pakistani terrorist cell took responsibility for the
attack.
The World Trade Center was attacked for a second time on September 11, 2001, when two planes
flew into its Twin Towers. It is estimated that roughly 3,000 people died in the 9/11 attacks; these
casualties includde plane passengers, Pentagon, and WTC victims. At the World Trade Center, there were
2,152 civilian casualties (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004), 60
police officer, and 343 fire fighter deaths (America.gov 2006). The attacks of September 11th are the
most heinous terrorist acts in United States history.
Since the events of September 11th, New York City has received multiple terrorism threats and
ongoing intelligence about potential threats. Most recently, on May 1, 2010, a car bomb planted by a
naturalized American citizen allegedly working under the direction of the Pakistani Taliban failed to
detonate in Times Square (The Associated Press 2010). The attempt was unraveled swiftly by officials,
and has fueled renewed public interest in counterterrorism and antiterrorism strategies.
Boston has not experienced any successful terrorist attacks; however, there was widespread panic
over a television publicity stunt initially believed to be a series of bombs. Adult Swim, a program on a
television channel owned by Turner Broadcasting, launched a guerilla marketing campaign for one of its
shows. The campaign involved a character made of LEDs gesturing with its middle finger. In late
January, 2007, the display was implemented 400 times in each of ten major U.S. cities. According to one
article,
While other cities took little notice, some residents of Boston mistook the batteries and
wires protruding from the devices for explosives and notified authorities. The city
quickly shut down major transportation corridors and spent close to $500,000 deploying
police and bomb-sniffing dogs. Turner Broadcasting took responsibility for the stunt,
issuing an apology and paying $1 million to the city and $1 million in "good will" funds
towards homeland security (MacMillan and Walters 2007).
While the incident was embarrassing to the city, it is possible that the 'terror drill' was invaluable.
As a result of divergent experiences dealing with and responding to local terrorist activity, New
York City and Boston have responded in very different ways to real and perceived threats. Below,
various facets of response in both cities will be explored, including design awareness and intervention, the
role of public and private actors, and the levels of education and coordination achieved in both cities.
PLAYERS AND PROCESSES
New York
In New York City, when antiterrorism interventions are proposed that will intrude on the public
realm, they are sent through a revocable consent process. Both privately and publicly- financed projects
must undergo the revocable consent procedure. A property manager must begin this review process by
submitting the proposed antiterrorism design to the Department of Transportation. Once the DOT
reviews the intervention, it is sent to the NYPD, the Fire Department (FDNY), the Department of
Buildings, the Department of City Planning, and the Design Commission. If the project has a subsurface
element, then it also must be reviewed by the New York City Department of Environmental Protection
and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. Finally, if the intervention is to be a part of a New York
City Historic District, it must be presented to the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission
(New York Police Department Counterterrorism Bureau 2009, 34). According to one New York City
source, some might think the revocable consent process to be long and tedious, since each agency has its
own priorities. An example of the challenges presented by multiple agency review can be found in the
attitude toward bollards. The design commission dictates that bollards should be no higher than thirty
inches, since people are accustomed to obstructions placed at waist-height (like desks). NYPD, by
contrast, is more concerned about evolving threats and protection, even at the cost of design. The agencies
must arrive at a compromise between their priorities, allowing for a very physical compromise to the
philosophical contentions of security in a democratic society.
Even antiterrorism design projects undertaken by private owners that do not intrude upon the
public realm tend to have some public agency involvement in New York City. NYPD SHIELD provides
the public-private interface to work as security consultants on private projects. The NYPD
Counterterrorism Division Threat Reduction and Infrastructure Protection Section conducts vulnerability
assessments for buildings as requested by private owners. Vulnerability assessments take months to
complete and produce detailed observations about the site and the building in question. In order to
produce these assessments, the Threat Reduction/Infrastructure Protection officers have numerous
meetings with other agencies and stakeholders (New York City Police Department 2010).
After this threat assessment process is completed, private businesses are under no obligation to
accept the advice of the NYPD and implement the suggested level of security measures. There is also a
belief by security officials and professions that building owners are more likely to underestimate the level
of threat against them. However, these same people concede that threat level is largely subjective, and
that different analysts tend to assess levels differently.
Suffice to say, most city agencies in New York have a stake in antiterrorism design. Boston
presents quite a different story.
ON LOCATION: OVERZEALOUS BOLLARD INSTALLATIONS
"Monotonous repetition
of a single element
should be avoided.
Block after block of the
same element, no matter
how attractive, does not
create good design.
When a continuous line
of bollards approaches100 feet, they should be
interspersed with other
streetscape elements,
such as hardened
benches, planters, or
trees (Federal
Emergency Management
Agency 2007, 132)."
Figure 16. Photographs by Sara Rothrock.
Over 400 feet in front of the Thomas 'Tip' O'Neil Building in Boston (from Causeway St & Lomasney
Way to past Causeway St & Portland Street) are protected by bulbous bollards.
The perimeter of
the site of the
Jacob K. Javitz
building in New
York City (on the
corner of Worth &
Lafayette Streets)
is entirely
surrounded by
squat black
bollards.
Figure 17. Photographs by Sara Rothrock.
ON LOCATION: TEMPORARY ANTITERRORISM DESIGN, OR LINGERING CPTED-ORIENTED TERRITORIAL
DELINEATION?
In these pictures, temporary fences (known
derisively as 'bike racks' to some in the security
industry), seem placed almost at random near and
around landmarks. To the left, New York City's St.
Andrew's Roman Catholic Church. Below,
pictures of fences around Boston's City Hall.
Figure 18. Photographs by Sara Rothrock.
Boston
It is obvious that Boston has publicly allocated resources and is capable of handling terrorist
threats. The chain of command for counterterrorism strategy in the city is as follows:
Boston Regional Intelligence Center------------- Joint Terrorism Task Force
Mayor's Office of Emergency Preparedness
Boston Police Department
Officers and Security Workers (as in the Chinatown BID)
However, the city does not have a public grasp on antiterrorism design. There appears to be no
agency providing oversight to public antiterrorism
design interventions and no revocable consent process.
The GSA guidelines are clearly at work for government
buildings, but the design is generally utilitarian and
violates basic design principles that encourage
pedestrian engagement at the site and sidewalk level. As
such, suggestions contained in FEMA 430 seem to have
made little impact. Antiterrorism design at sites runs the
gambit from starkly confusing (repetitive bollards of the
Figure 19. Bank of Boston/Bank of America Headquarters.
Photograph by the author. Tip O'Neill building, as pictured previously) to
appealing (such as the sitting area created at Boston's Bank of
American headquarters), to obtrusively temporary, to
undesirably restrictive (as in the case of the State House).
Though these site conditions can similarly be found in New
York City, Boston appears to lack of formal process with which
to deal with these issues and interventions. In short, the
antiterrorism design interventions in Boston not only began as
ad-hoc, but have continued that way almost ten years later.
There is no advisory body or public consulting mechanism as
with the NYPD.
The agency best-positioned to conduct antiterrorism
design critiques in Boston is the Boston Civic Design
Figure 20. Attractive metal gates block access to Commission (BCDC). Unfortunately, the Design Commission is
alternative entrances to the State House, as well as not given the power to review building retrofits only new
the statue of John F. Kennedy. Photograph by the
author.
projects. When it is called to approve certain high-security projects, its role is mainly ceremonial. The
BCDC is, however, able to make comments on lobbies in the city. Also, according to David Carlson,
Senior Architect with the Boston Redevelopment Authority and Executive Director of the Commission,
there is a movement to make security retrofits in the city more understated. The BCDC attempts to ensure
that barriers are constructed in a way so that they are not intimidating to the public. The Commission is
interested in engaging pedestrians with the sidewalk by encouraging transparency at ground level.
According to Director Carlson, the BCDC does not orient its judgment of design interventions with
suggestions from FEMA documents; rather, it uses urban design principles to inform a conversation of
what would work best in any particular environment. Interaction with private security consultants occurs
mainly when the commission is advocating for through-block access (Carlson 2010).
LOCAL ANTITERRORISM DESIGN DOCUMENTS
As it does not have a specific design protocol, Boston does not have a city-specific design
document. New York, however, has produced two informative works. The first, Designingfor Security,
was created by what was Art Commission of the City of New York and the Design Trust for Public Space
in the spring of 2002 (Russell, et al. 2002). The second, Engineering Security, was created in the summer
of 2009 (New York Police Department Counterterrorism Bureau 2009).
The research for Designing for Security was commissioned in 1997. Even then, before the events
and ad hoc interventions of the post-9/1 1 city, a post-Oklahoma City bombing thoughtfulness emerged.
In the opening pages of the document, the writers assert,
We believe that the thoughtful assimilation of security theory and techniques - for
example, surveillance and defensible space - will mitigate future needs for fortress-like
construction to achieve reasonable security goals (Russell, et al. 2002).
The document briefly walks readers through the ways in which design influences behavior, and some of
the leading place-based crime prevention strategies. The remainder of the document educates the reader
as to how the public can take ownership of projects, how certain categories of design interventions
function (barriers, thresholds, and circulation), and how art can be more thoughtfully integrated into
security projects. Examples of projects are interspersed throughout the document to provide readers with
inspiration.
In Engineering Security, the NYPD provides information on creating buildings and building sites
that withstand or thwart traditional terrorist attacks, and, in the event of their failure to do so, evacuate
people and then fall apart in the safest way possible. The document familiarizes readers with threat
analyses, standoff recommendations, and the revocable consent process. Additionally, it begins a design
conversation, indicating that Jersey barriers and concrete planters are not meant to be long-term solutions,
and that some perimeter security measures could prove difficult to navigate for people with disabilities
and can disrupt foot traffic. The document advocates that there should be a thorough vehicle threat vector
analysis conducted before invasive design is considered.
With the exception of a discussion of local processes and the exclusive use of pictures from New
York City, the document seems largely a repeat of the FEMA and GSA guidelines. However, unlike the
GSA guidelines, private owners are strongly recommended to follow the suggestions contained within the
pages; and, since the document was created specifically for New York, private owners have greater
incentive to follow the suggestions. According to an unnamed source, Engineering Security grew out of
the previously informal consulting service the NYPD provided for private developers post-9/1 1. After the
consulting service became more popular, the NYPD worked with developers to create Engineering
Security as a guiding document. The work was peer-reviewed and truly collaborative. Though it was
spearheaded by the NYPD, it was contributed to by a few of the larger developers in New York City.
These developers and design firms include Thorton Tomasetti, AECOM, Applied Research Associates,
Inc., Severud Associates, Venter & Santore, Rogers Marvel Architects, and Weidlinger Associates, Inc.
Advisers from the National Capital Planning Commission and Rutgers University were also consulted
(New York Police Department Counterterrorism Bureau 2009).
In conclusion, New York City's public sector has a much larger influence over crime prevention
design and antiterrorism design than does Boston. This is likely a result of the history of the cities. New
York has a history of terror attacks, while Boston does not. As a result of New York's intimate experience
of terror events and analysis of its own reaction, it has created both guiding documents and specific
design procedures.
Now that antiterrorism processes have been explored, CPTED policies must be addressed. As
with antiterrorism design, New York and Boston have divergent approaches.
CPTED
Both New York and Boston have a history of employing place-based crime prevention strategies.
As described in a previous chapter, Oscar Newman's theories of defensible space began when he was
awarded funding to research public housing in New York City. Both New York and Boston eventually
employed Newman's strategies in their public housing. Though New York was first, Boston followed
eagerly. In Reclaiming Public Housing, author Lawrence Vale articulates Boston's embrace of defensible
space in the redesign of three of its housing projects (Vale 2002). Modem iterations of CPTED and
place-based crime prevention design strategies will be reviewed later in this chapter. Suffice to say,
historically, both cities had experienced problematic public housing projects, New York and Boston had
similar attitudes toward the use of Newman's defensible space theories.
While it is clear that defensible space was pursued with regard to public housing, it is more
difficult to follow the thread of place-based crime prevention tactics as they translate to policies and
strategies for modem downtowns.
Boston
Boston has no formalized crime prevention design assessments. CPTED policies are not used in
any formal context, but some general ideas (like ensuring visual permeability) have been employed when
looking at potential issues in certain city parks. In general, the Boston police are not normally consulted
about design strategies for private or public projects, and has no coordination with the Boston
Redevelopment Authority or the Boston Civic Design Commission. However, the police department does
respond to the threat of terrorism. In particular, the BPD plays a key role in managing the transport of
hazardous materials safely through Boston's city streets.
New York
New York City has a dedicated Crime Prevention Unit that gives free security surveys to private
building owners. Not only that, but the unit's Special Projects team is routinely requested to participate in
Value Engineering Studies and Risk Assessments for City construction projects. CPTED (Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design) principles are applied early on in the design of these projects.
This team has also been increasingly called upon to conduct surveys relative to highly sensitive security
issues at all levels of government (New York Police Department 2010).
A call to the Crime Prevention Unit confirmed that the team knows its way around a security
survey and CPTED. Deputy Inspector Michael Nemoyten spoke with me about preserving sightlines and
how design considerations are taken very seriously in planning for a new NYPD training facility
(Nemoyten 2010). A conversation with Sergeant Stephen Carolan of the unit was even more enlightening-
the NYPD has been integrating CPTED into its security surveys for approximately the last ten years.
Elaborating, Carolan stated that it's not "spelled out" in the security assessment provided to property
owners, but the principles are all there. He lamented that people call the NYPD to look at design as an
afterthought, begrudgingly admitting that sometimes all that's possible is target hardening. He related one
instance where the NYPD was brought to do a security assessment on a high-rise next to a five-storey
condominium. "The roof of the condo was accessible to the tenement buildings. The only thing to do was
to put bars on the window, which we don't like to do, because it makes people think that there's criminal
activity" (interview). When asked how often they were invited into the design process on new buildings,
the Sergeant revealed that "There are times we look at blueprints, but not as often as we'd like. Mostly
consultants are brought in to give advice. As an afterthought they call us." If the NYPD is called for a
security survey, it is usually by the building manager (Carolan 2010).
New York City seems to have a good grasp on CPTED and its implications. Prior to the events of
September 11th, the Crime Prevention Unit used to look at and give advice regarding threat assessments,
but this task now falls to the counterterrorism unit, as explained above.
There is evidence from academic sources pointing to the use of defensible space and CPTED
principles in New York City. According to one article, "at the New York Port Authority Bus Terminal 63
specific design interventions (including access control, cleaning and enhancing formal surveillance by
staff) significantly reduced robberies and assaults" (Cozens, Saville and Hillier 2005). Less detailed
accounts of success similarly suggest that New York City has made use of CPTED principles in its
planning, policing, and revitalizing strategies.
STATISTICS
A discussion on CPTED would be incomplete without at least a brief analysis of relevant
crime statistics. The statistics found below are associated with the Boston Police Department's
District 1 (which includes Boston's Government Center and Financial District-roughly, its
downtown) and the territory of Lower Manhattan's Downtown Alliance. According to their
website, the Downtown Alliance "manages the Downtown-Lower Manhattan Business
Improvement District (BID), serving an area roughly from City Hall to the Battery, from the East
River to West Street" (Downtown Alliance 2010). The maps showing approximate extents of
both District 1 and the Downtown Alliance BID are at the same scale.
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Figure 21. At left: approximate extent of District 1 of the Boston Police Department (Boston's downtown). At right:
approximate extent of the Downtown Alliance's BID, which, like District 1, includes New York City's financial and
government district. Maps created by author, using ESRI's ArcMap and data provided by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
It is important to note that the area patrolled by the Downtown Alliance in New York City and the area in
Boston known as District Al are not the same in size. District Al is roughly 1.5 times the size of the
Downtown Alliance area. However, both District Al and the Downtown Alliance areas contain what are
considered the 'downtowns' of both cities. Both downtowns encompass a financial district and a
government district.
Below are bar graphs showing the number of crimes against persons and crimes against property
in downtown New York City and downtown Boston. The numbers exist as reference points, but they are
not immediately necessary-the interesting comparison here is general trends in the numbers. The Boston
statistics are from the Boston Police Department, and the New York statistics are from the Downtown
Alliance. 1
Boston provided the number of crimes in the district. The Downtown Alliance, however, is part of one NYPD
precinct, and so pulls its own numbers from a larger list. Instead of providing the number of crimes each year, the
Downtown Alliance finds it more meaningful to represent its statistics by calculating how many days must progress
before one crime occurs. For example, a rating of 0.2 means that, on average, five days had to pass in that year
before one crime was committed. For the sake of more immediately comparable numbers, the statistics have been
reverse-calculated to what an approximate of the original statistic might have been.
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With the exception of violent crimes in downtown Boston, it seems that all crime has been decreasing
since the earliest years in these graphs. The change in property crimes in downtown New York City
beginning in 2001 is particularly marked. There could be a number of reasons for the downward trend in
crimes, including increased police vigilance or presence in an area (likely), dramatic errors or changes in
reporting crimes (unlikely), or fewer people to commit crimes against (likely in NYC immediately after
9/11). It is possible that so much property crime occurred at the World Trade Center that its decimation
accounted for some of the statistical change. While this was almost certainly a contributing factor, I
believe that antiterrorism interventions, and particularly lobby hardening, have much to do with the
decrease in property crimes downtown.
'0
Property crimes are more likely than violent crimes to be influenced by antiterrorism design and
lobby hardening. This is because property crimes are more often crimes of opportunity than crimes of
violence (which are more likely to have some forethought involved). Hardened lobbies, increased police
vigilance, and the presence of CCTV are likely to decrease opportunities for property crime. According
to one source, prior to lobby hardening in downtown Boston, there used to be much more larceny in office
buildings. Thieves could enter buildings dressed as office workers and steal laptops and wallets. It is
interesting to note, however, that the number of car break-ins since has escalated, and displacement is the
likely cause.
In New York City, the numbers (and the stories) are similar. Sergeant Stephen Carolan of the
New York Police Department's Crime Prevention Unit asserted that "the crime in New York is way
down," but that larceny is still a problem. He continued, "if there's someone who wants to rob a house as
their livelihood, and they can't get into the house, they're going to find other ways to support their
livelihood.. .You're not going to reform, you're going to displace" (Carolan 2010).
CONCLUSION
Research in New York City and Boston reveals important issues. First and foremost, this research
illustrates that it can be difficult to obtain any information regarding antiterrorism interventions. While
this fact is credible to a point, information from public entities regarding interventions that are readily
visible should not be so difficult to obtain. Rather than having to do with security issues, this reaction is
purely about fear. There is so little discussion about antiterrorism in general that the mere mention of it
seems to send some individuals up in arms.
Second, New York City has a clear public process of public realm antiterrorism design vetting,
while Boston does not. Similarly, New York City has a public agency (the NYPD) available to provide
threat assessments for both public and private properties, while Boston does not. New York City's 'open
and available' approach to antiterrorism design is likely the result of meeting a public demand for these
services, which Boston most likely does not have (at least not at the same volume). Public demand for
services is likely a result of the history of terrorist activity in New York City and the larger size of the
city.
Third, property crimes have decreased in both Boston and New York from 1998-2008. While it
is likely that this decrease is the result of several factors, one factor is undoubtedly the implementation of
antiterrorism interventions. This hypothesis that antiterrorism interventions in general (and lobby
hardening and CCTV in particular) aided in the drop of more prosaic day-to-day crimes in urban
downtowns was informally supported by contacts at both the New York and Boston police departments.
The next chapter will explore Civic Design, another design paradigm vital to creating not only a
vibrant downtown, but a healthy public realm. The basic principles of designing for good public spaces
are reviewed. Additionally, five basic tenets of Civic Design are proposed.
CHAPTER 6
THE PUBLIC REALM AND CIVic DESIGN
It is clear that the richness of urban public space in Boston and New York City is created by
something other than innovative ATD and adherence to CPTED. ATD may protect buildings from
terrorist attack, and CPTED will optimize the safety and security of a public place through design
strategies, but even the combination of both will only go so far to promote a vibrant public realm. What is
truly necessary is a humanizing framework for these security strategies and interventions. Civic Design is
just such a framework.
As suggested in the Introduction, and, indeed, throughout this thesis, a vibrant public realm is key
to the success of both Boston and New York as cities of national and international acclaim. A vibrant
public realm relies upon the degree to which urban public spaces adhere to the myriad principles of good
public space design. Many urban designers, theorists and public space advocates have contributed to the
collective understanding of what constitutes good public space. William H. Whyte focused on the
physical qualities of good public space. Kevin Lynch looked at both physical and theoretical qualities,
asking questions about presence, use and action, appropriation, modification, and disposition (Lynch, A
Theory of Good City Form 1981).
Project for Public Spaces, a nonprofit organization in New York City, is the champion of great
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Figure 22. Attributes of place, retrieved from www.pps.org
public realm design. It
makes it its business to
assess the quality of
public spaces and define
the qualities of good
spaces. Project for Public
Spaces comprehensively
defines the elements that
contribute to the creation
of a space in the adjacent
diagram:
The words in orange are
the 'key' attributes that
determine the quality of a
space: sociability, uses
and activities, comfort
these quadrants, a place may
be more or less successful in terms of fulfilling its potential for becoming an icon of public space (Project
for Public Spaces 2010).
Clearly, Project for Public Spaces has spent time compiling qualitative and quantitative data in
order to create this diagram. In it are the influences of Kevin Lynch, Jane Jacobs, William H. Whyte,
Shlomo Angel, and a myriad of other notable planners and theorists. This framework of criteria and
considerations may be used as a benchmark against which all urban public spaces are measured.
However, as suggested at the beginning of this section, it is not simply good public realm design that is
necessary to create and sustain healthy public space. In particular, it is imperative that the tenets of good
Civic Design are used to humanize Antiterrorism Design.
According to one author, "Civic Design is approaching how we use, plan, physically design, and
support our communities and the public realm in a way that benefits citizens, citizenship, and the city"
(Steiner 2006). Civic Design, then, differs from public realm design in that it is specifically crafted to
benefit and even engage people with the larger civic environment. This is especially important to think
about in relation to Antiterrorism Design. Ideally, Civic Design coupled with Antiterrorism Design must
not only protect people, but also engage them with the intervention, encouraging them to understand the
design and become a part of an enlightened citizenry to combat terror.
From a CPTED perspective, too, Civic Design is a goal to strive toward. In Chapter 3 of this
thesis, the principles of second-wave CPTED were examined and defined as a movement of crime
prevention through community building. Key interests involved neighborhood capacity, community
culture, cohesion, and connectivity (Saville and Cleveland, An introduction to 2nd Generation CPTED
2003). A study of a Dutch CPTED plan revealed the importance of creating meeting places, human-scale
development, and engaging residents. The Dutch plan was describing the positive outcomes when
CPTED embraces Civic Design.
Civic Design is an overall goal of public realm design, and good Civic Design will share the same
qualities of good public space design. Public realm design must support and enable Civic Design. Based
on my research, I have developed a list of five basic Civic Design principles.
- Multi-lateral implementation
" Accessibility
= Safety
= Stewardship
- Education
All of these together will create projects that not only delight passersby, but that engage with people in
the public realm.
MULTI-LATERAL IMPLEMENTATION
The concept of "Civic Design" necessarily implies a multilateral design conception and
implementation. Beautiful accessible spaces have been created unilaterally in the past. However, while
these might be civic at end (by design), they are not truly civic unless created by multiple stakeholders. In
John de Monchaux's "Getting Things Done in Messy Cities," the author wrote about the necessity of
'messiness' in cities, defining 'messiness' as a desirable quality of the urban environment that allows for
complex relationships and serendipitous creation. He writes,
To think of cities as messy places will properly caution us against the use of exclusive,
unidimensional, or egocentric actions. To respect the messiness of cities encourages the
opportunity for pluralistic actions that not only will serve the very diverse interests of the
city's people, but in the end, I maintain, will give greater delight and reward (de
Monchaux 1989).
This is the crux of Civic Design: for endeavors to be multilateral and interwoven. This strategy varies
notably with the way that most ATD interventions are implemented. As demonstrated from attempts to
speak with key players in ATD, the process and tools employed in Antiterrorism Design can be secretive
and obscure to the community at large.
ACCESSIBILITY
In order for a space to merit the description of being inspired by 'Civic Design,' it must also be
accessible. Accessibility has two major attributes and a corollary. First, an accessible place must be easy
to get to. This means that anyone can find it and get there. It is not hidden, it is not exclusive, and it is a
space that meets the needs of all potential users, including the elderly and handicapped. Second, an
accessible place must be perceived as 'central,' or 'close to other things.' If this is not the case, then the
space does not reflect truly Civic Design. A beautiful park in a marginal space inaccessible to multiple
groups of people is not an example of Civic Design. The corollary to accessibility is safety.
SAFETY
A civic space must be perceived as safe and comfortable. These concepts directly refer back to
the Project for Public Spaces diagram. Safety is a corollary of accessibility because it influences
perception of access. If a place is not perceived of as safe or desirable to be in, then people will feel that
it is inaccessible to them. The creation of a sense of safety in civic space harkens back to the discussion
of the social contract in the introduction of this thesis. Since it is the responsibility for the government to
make its people safe, it stands to reason that civic spaces-ones that respond to the citizen's interaction
with the state-should also be safe. Safety can only truly be achieved, though, through some type of
stewardship of the space.
STEWARDSHIP
"Civic Design" could perhaps more accurately be called "civic-minded" design. According to the
Merriam-Webster dictionary, to be civic-minded is to be "disposed to look after civic needs and interests"
(Merriam-Webster 2002). Civic Design should inspire people to take part-through interacting with the
space, maintaining it, and thereby defending it. A place with truly Civic Design will become important to
the people who populate it. These people must provide advertising (through word of mouth),
maintenance (through reporting damage to proper authorities or even through continued presence), and
entertainment (by populating and thereby becoming actors) for the space. These people, directly or
indirectly, must speak for the space. By speaking for civic spaces, people are speaking for themselves
and for the myriad others who would benefit from the space. Consider the number of beloved spaces
which have "Friends of' groups dedicated to them.
In cities that are made of corridors, patches, and nodes (to muddle Kevin Lynch and Richard
Forman) of beloved civic spaces, it may be too much to ask that each plot become the beneficiary of such
a group. However, the police are not enough. Citizens themselves must be called to action for their civic
spaces. There must be a civic sense to compel them to try to understand and be on the alert for terrorism.
This can be accomplished through education.
EDUCATION
A corollary of stewardship, education is a cornerstone of Civic Design. The concept of 'civic'
hinges on the idea of a multitude of people coming together to form one society. The society becomes
more than the sum of its parts; however, if its parts are uninformed, society itself is uninformed. In the
case of terrorism, this is a dangerous omission from public knowledge. A civic space, then, should
somehow educate its users about their part in a greater picture. The space can be designed in a way that
helps people to form questions. An excellent example of a company that understands Civic Design is
Rogers Marvel, a design firm based in New York City.
In its design philosophy, Rogers Marvel declares that all ATD interventions should be amenities.
Instead of considering mainly constraints (that buildings must be protected against terrorists), the firm
thought in terms of opportunity. Rogers Marvel creates amenities to draw people (or, at the very least, to
not push people away) and to intrigue them. Their security sculptures (No-Gos) help locals and tourists to
ask questions about presence and meaning of antiterrorism while drawing them nearer and asking them to
interact.
CONCLUSION
Although CPTED will optimize Antiterrorism Design in a way that will aid it to become less
intrusive and more responsive to daily conditions, this optimization will not necessarily promote the
creation of useful or beloved public space. CPTED must be used to optimize Antiterrorism Design, and
Civic Design principles must be used to humanize Antiterrorism Design. These three design paradigms
(ATD, CPTED, and Civic Design) must be used in tandem to help modernize the urban downtown and
prevent it from losing all traditional character.
Civic Design is imperative to maintaining the vibrancy of the downtown public realm and the
making the ATD process about knowledge rather than fear. An educated public is capable of defending
itself. Without knowledge of what one is looking for, what good are eyes on the street?
The next chapter will use principles, findings, and research from this and earlier chapters to
propose several recommendations for Boston and New York City. While these recommendations will be
tailored specifically for the two cities, they are likely to be useful for any large city implementing
antiterrorism interventions.
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CHAPTER 7
OPTIMIZING ANTITERRORISM DESIGN: RECOMMENDA TIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In the previous chapters, it has been illustrated that, theoretically, ATD and CPTED are
compatible. If this synergy is theoretically possible, designers, planners, and building owners must strive
to achieve compatibility at all site levels. Achieving compatibility will optimize site safety and security,
which is crucial to restoring a balance for safety concerns in urban downtowns, while supporting good
urban design practice. While it is important (for some sites) to prepare for terrorist attack, it is equally
important to pay attention to the safety of site visitors on a day-to-day basis. Preparing for terrorist attack
but ignoring basic, daily safety concerns is like preparing for a lightning strike but failing to plan for rain.
The worst case scenario must be considered, but daily conditions are just as, if not more, important. Worst
case scenarios are anticipated in order to preserve daily function. But if daily function is impaired to begin
with, there must be a balance in investment and interventions. By using site safety (CPTED) to optimize
site security (ATD), and acknowledging the principles of civic design, urban areas can achieve a balance
between the need for security and the need for the preservation of vibrant downtowns. This balance will
be explored in this chapter.
The research in this thesis has consistently led to the same conclusion: CPTED and ATD design
principles and goals are compatible. Deference to CPTED in antiterrorism design reports (specifically
FEMA 426, 430, and Engineering Security) further strengthens this connection. The chart, found after
Part I of this thesis, identifies places of compromise and the few areas of incongruity between ATD and
CPTED design strategies. For the purpose of detailed discussion, I have created an abridged chart below,
illustrated with the images of scale as seen in the ATD in Action and CPTED in Action chapters. Each
image is associated with the scale it represents, and is followed by a list of design strategies or elements
for ATD that are not compliant with CPTED. A second chart follows, showing the elements for CPTED
that are not compliant with ATD.
Table 10. Elements for ATD not compliant with CPTED
Scale of the grid
. Movement Predictors
. Security Zones
Scale of the site Scale of the building
. Fortressing
. Building oriented inward
. Removing windows at
ground level
Table 11. Elements for CPTED not compliant with ATD
Scale of the Scale of the grid
downtown
Scale of the site Scale of the building
. Building oriented
outward
. Transparency at ground
level
Note that the discrepancies between the two design strategies fall within two scales: the scale of
the grid and the scale of the building. (In fact, CPTED is only non-compliant with ATD at the building
level.) It is interesting to note that these discrepancies are issues of fundamental design philosophy within
each strategy, and not necessarily the predominant discrepancies that actually occur in practice.
Scale of the
downtown
Visits to Boston and New York indicate that the discrepancies between ATD and CPTED are
largely at the site scale. Poorly-articulated separations between the public and private realm, repetitive
security elements, and empty or threatening spaces are common sights in both cities. This does not imply
that CPTED and ATD are not compatible at the site scale (as shown above), but rather illustrates a gap in
knowledge about the possibility for optimization. The philosophy, as clearly articulated in ATD
documents, is not translated through practice. Future research in the area of ATD optimization should
endeavor to discern why this is the case by focusing on strategies utilized by security design firms and
looking at the processes used to determine design strategies.
In light of these findings, it seems that with physical manifestations of ATD, only lip service has
been paid to CPTED. ATD and CPTED have yet to be truly integrated in practice, which has created a
number of missed opportunities and troubling design implications. As indicated above, integration would
allow for site design optimization. Optimization would increase the likelihood of crime prevention from
both a prosaic daily perspective as well as a terrorist event perspective.
REGULATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AS CONTRIBUTORS TO THE PUBLIC REALM
While instances of non-optimization between ATD and CPTED are, in a broad sense, issues of
'public safety,' David Carlson from the Boston Civic Design Commission noted that 'public safety' in
terms of the design environment is an elusive issue (Carlson 2010). This is because the space that hosts
ATD and CPTED interventions is either semi-private or private. CPTED and antiterrorism design are
issues that are of particular interest in the site design and perimeters of buildings. Often, all of this space
is privately-owned, thus making site security not a 'public safety' issue, but a 'private safety' issue. It is
the private owners that generate a threat assessment of their building, decide on the security tier, and act
to mitigate perceived threats. In the words of one security expert,
With a majority of critical infrastructure in the private sector, it is important to note that
responsibility for security and protection rests with the owners of infrastructure
themselves. The nudging and supervision of the federal government is necessary to make
sure there is a standard of care (Atlas and DiGregario 2008).
There are no standards to force compliance, other than building codes. The latest building codes
incorporate some information of importance, but do not go nearly as far as suggested in the FEMA
documents or the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) Design Criteria. Building codes do not specify
much site design, which is what most affects and concerns the public in the use and perception of urban
space (and on which most of this thesis focuses).
When comparing the process of physical intervention planning and installation in New York and
Boston, it is clear that New York's review process is much more open and delineated than Boston's. New
York sets guidelines and designates an agency responsible for ensuring conformity to the process (the
DOT). Boston's process is much less transparent, perhaps because there are fewer instances of public
realm interventions, and fewer historic events that have forced the city to deal with these issues.
Regardless of municipal or state guidance in terms of invasion of and intervention within the
public realm, there are many more issues related to site design of private property. However, in the urban
environment, the public and private environments are so closely linked that one bleeds into the other. As
described in the last chapter, Boston deals with this through its Civic Design Commission. The
Commission's mission statement includes the following:
The BCDC's purpose.. .is to provide a forum for the general public and the professional
design community to participate in the shaping of the city's physical form and natural
environment.. .its primary function has been as design advisors, both to the Boston
Redevelopment Authority (BRA) and to project proponents. We believe that projects
reviewed by the Commission have been improved by this review process and, more
importantly, their impact on the streets and squares, the public domain of Boston, has
been made more positive. As individual designers focus their attention on specific
projects for their clients, it is our role to think of the city as a whole (Boston
Redevelopment Authority 2010).
Boston, through the BCDC, recognizes the interplay between public and private properties. By creating
an entity (BCDC) to judge the city "as a whole," Boston acknowledges that the private realm influences
the public realm; or, that one element can easily influence the whole of an urban environment.
In terms of ATD, the impact of one security zone can be felt for several blocks. Target hardening
of private buildings in an area will, as a cumulative effect, create an unfriendly space and frighten away
pedestrians. On the other hand, as proven by several terrorist incidents in the last fifty years, failing to
implement effective site design can lead to catastrophic damage by truck bomb not only in the target
building, but in nearby structures as well.
Since the myriad private decisions create a significant impact on the city, they should be guided
or incentivized to adhere to certain regulations. There are a number of design suggestions, like the FEMA
guidelines, but these have no teeth. The documents have a friendly didactic tone, and seem more directed
to interested government officials and educated laypeople than to decision-makers in agencies or security
firms responsible for site design. The document guidelines present neither sticks nor carrots to reinforce
convictions, only suggestions for well-being. This is not enough of an incentive to create true, lasting,
and responsible site security. These guidelines will not ensure that CPTED is built into ATD
interventions. As described through images in previous chapters, FEMA guidelines certainly have not
ensured CPTED is built into ATD interventions so far.
Nor will guidelines ensure that the principles of civic design are sought after or fulfilled at these
sites. As indicated in the last chapter, deference to civic design principles will ultimately determine how
well ATD interventions fit into the context of the city and how truly effective they can be. The creation
of physical protection should not be the sole purpose of ATD; rather, ATD should simultaneously provide
amenities and inspire questions and cognizance regarding
the urban environment.
To the left is a diagram of the interrelation of ATD
civic D(in red), CPTED (in yellow), and civic design (in blue). The
Civic Design Design ATD principles of CPTED fit easily within the principles of civic
& Only
CPTED design, as they seek to promote safety and create a
cognizance regarding the urban environment. ATD and
CPTED largely overlap, as illustrated by the charts earlier in
this chapter. However, there are a few discrepancies
Image 23. Civic Design, CPTED, and ATD between ATD and CPTED, and indeed between ATD and
civic design, that edge ATD just out of the circle that
represents both CPTED and Civic Design principles and goals.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based upon the understanding of optimization of the three design paradigms (Civic Design,
CPTED, and ATD), I propose several recommendations to allow public officials, building owners, and
security professionals to guide their practice so as to encourage it to fall within the strategic gray area on
the diagram above. This gray area represents the confluence of all three design paradigms, and projects
developed at this intersection will capitalize on the strengths of each.
The recommendations for strengthening the enforcement of design optimization are categorized
below as design and policy strategies. The design recommendation list is arranged by scale, beginning at
the largest (scale of the downtown) and moving to the smallest (scale of the building). It is crucial for
both lists to concentrate on the largest scale possible, as protection at this largest scale will mitigate the
need for dramatic security interventions at the more invasive site and building scales. Note that, in
addition to bringing ATD into compliance with CPTED, the recommendations below also embrace the
tenets of civic design.
DESIGNRECOMM ENDATIONS
SCALE OF THE DOWNTOWN
1. Encourage the 'ring of steel' in high-threat CBDs. Spotty, non-cohesive security is ineffectual
security that encourages piecemeal private solutions that erode the public realm. Public officials charged
with protecting downtowns facing legitimate threats should have the capacity to review information at the
largest scale possible. If counterterrorism can be employed at a larger scale and promote security around
the outer perimeter of the downtown, then dramatic antiterrorism measures within the downtown are more
likely to be unnecessary.
This suggestion is not without base: not only has a 'ring of steel' worked well (from an
antiterrorism and crime prevention standpoint) in London, it has recently been proposed and dismissed in
New York City. Traditionally Americans are more uncomfortable with CCTV than the British (Schneider
and Kitchen 2001), and even Londoners were aggrieved when the 'ring' was first established. The
possibility of constructing a 'ring of steel' is likely to take some time to accrue public approval.
However, this approach provides too many benefits for it to be dropped completely. The New York City
intervention was proposed as a manner through which to implement a congestion tax. While that was
unlikely to be the true motivation for the plan, it would certainly prove to be a boon for the city's public
transportation system, which is currently under financial duress. As a result, it would also impart
environmental benefits. There are many clear winners if a ring of steel were to be established, but in order
for the project to resurface and garner the necessary public approval, public education campaigns must be
launched and government representatives must be resolute in their goals.
SCALE OF THE GRID
2. Where security zones are imperative, activate the spaces. Security zones should be seen as places of
opportunity, not places devoid of life. Create environments that are capable of being supervised but that
are interesting and will invite people in. This is not to suggest that people need to be right up against a
secure building; rather, a secure perimeter can still be maintained while activating the rest of the space.
Consider installation of community vegetable gardens or a small playground. Encourage vendors and add
removable seating. There is no reason that even 'secure' space should be wasted in the downtown.
Spaces in New York City (like the area near One Police Plaza) and Beverly Street in Boston should not
continue to be vacant. Beverly Street in particular could become a lunchtime asset to workers in nearby
government buildings. Or it might become an open-air museum commemorating the West End
neighborhood that once stood in the vicinity.
3. Remove movement predictors where possible. If the physical design of a place will not allow for
removal, then modify the space with security mirrors and emergency phones. Entrapment areas must be
closed at night.
SCALE OF THE SITE
4. CPTED principles MUST be inte2rated with Antiterrorism desi2n at the site level. Failing to
integrate the two strategies is a design travesty. While there may be budgetary reasons for failing to
renovate ugly interventions, there are no excuses for the presence of those interventions to begin with, or
the fact that they do not maximize CPTED strategies where possible. Policies articulated in the section
below should help to mandate this.
SCALE OF THE BUILDING
5. Disincentivize all fortressing, except in extreme situations. ATD calls for removal of all ground
floor windows; however, for the sake of both CPTED and Civic Design, ground floor transparency in the
form of windows must be permitted, and architecture must remain inviting and open. As a compromise,
ground floor windows on high risk buildings should be mandatorily reinforced, and site level architectural
elements should be bolstered. The face of the city should be retrofitted to adapt to terrorist activity, but it
should not be fundamentally altered.
POLICYRECOMMENDATIONS
1. Local government must appoint an agency accountable for reviewing public realm antiterrorism
interventions. New York already has this mechanism in place. Obvious candidates in Boston include the
Boston Civic Design Commission or the Department of Transportation; however, adding this power to
either agency might not be as effective as creating a new supervisory panel at the Boston Redevelopment
Authority (BRA).
2. Downtowns servin2 urbanized areas with Census populations greater than one million must
create individualized Security Plans. If a Master Plan of the downtown exists, the Security Plan may be
merged with it. All urbanized areas with Census populations greater than one million should build a
section on security into long range master planning. Security is a goal that cities should work toward, and
it is something that can be gently guided, rather than being left completely to the interest of private
companies. Regardless of terrorist threat level, urban safety concerns and goals should be acknowledged.
The master plan should address the importance of CPTED in this process. Security plans should be
created through a multi-lateral process involving the planning agency, the police department, interested
citizens, and private corporations with interests in the downtown.
Perhaps one of the most important functions of building a security section into the master plan is
the opportunity to designate goals for different city sections. This idea is largely inspired by the National
Capital Planning Commission, which divided Washington, D.C. into natural sections. Each section was
given a different 'security aesthetic.' As superficial as this seems, providing cohesive design can prevent
security from overpowering the experience of the urban environment. In terms of creating this type of
aesthetic plan in urban areas, it seems that there will be natural breaks that a planning commission will be
able to recognize immediately. In addition, there might be sections of the city where security goals differ.
This is not the same as creating a 'security aesthetic' in the downtown.
Boston already has a coordinated street furniture program. It includes automatic public toilets,
bus shelters, city information panels, newsstands, and telephone pillars. This program could also be used
to coordinate bollards, benches, and planters where they are deemed necessary through thorough threat
assessment.
Building security into the master plan, even in terms of aesthetics, will provide an opportunity to
increase recognition of territory at a larger than normal scale (in a 'district' rather than a 'site'). Creating
clear delineations will enhance territoriality, and help to create an identity and ownership. Creation of
visual districts in terms of security will also create an easier way of noting compliance and ensuring
regulation. This will aid in the transfer of the public realm to agencies in the public sector.
3. Design guidelines crafted to meet the functional and aesthetic needs of the Master Security Plan
should be concurrently drafted. These must include CPTED guidelines that are geared to conform to
local preferences. For examples, planners should look toward guidelines from Tempe, Arizona; Broward
County, Sarasota, Tampa, and Orlando, Florida; and Ann Arbor, Michigan (R. Atlas, 21st Century
Security 2008). These places already have CPTED codes in place. There should also be a discussion of
the inherent compatibility of CPTED and ATD to avoid conflicts at the site scale in actual practice.
4. All interventions must go through the traditional design review process to check for compliance
with CPTED and civic design 2oals.
These changes are exceptionally important in order to maintain traditionally vibrant downtowns
and central business districts in post-9/11 America. CPTED must be fully integrated with Antiterrorism
Design; otherwise, the qualities of downtown that have defined American cities since colonial times will
be lost. Using CPTED as the optimizing force on ATD is strategic, since it not only is familiar to
important agencies within the city, but it also endeavors to make life safe on a day-to-day basis. CPTED
and ATD together herald a time where security planners are as interested in crime that makes life difficult
on a day-to-day basis (crimes against people and against property) as they are in crime that is more
infrequent though more catastrophic.
CONCLUSION
This thesis visits the history, theory, and practice of both antiterrorism design and CPTED. It
explores the manifestations of both strategies in New York and Boston in an effort to discern where and
how synergies are plausible. It proposed to better integrate both ATD and CPTED with civic design.
Finally, it concluded with civic design-oriented recommendations for Boston and New York City (and
other cities, generally) to optimize antiterrorism design with CPTED.
There is still much research to do on this topic. Policies and designs in other cities should be
explored, and security design education should be analyzed. In the future, models of antiterrorism design
intervention decision-making should be created for both public and private processes, and compared to
real scenarios. Future researchers should consult more closely with decisions-makers and cultivate a
closer connection to agencies involved in the antiterrorism design process.
In an endeavor to begin to explain the urban elements of the post-9/11 city, this thesis wanders
through the modern mire of antiterrorism design. History has predisposed ATD to be militaristic. This is
an inappropriate reaction for the design of urban downtowns, which are supposed to be the very example
of lively and open public realms. Unfortunately, many ATD interventions display just such militaristic
design determination. It is peculiar that the ailment of militaristic design has been noted in design
documents that exhibit best practices, but that situations have not been remedied. However, there have
been no incentives for change in pre-existing interventions, and the recent economic downturn may have
only exacerbated plans for remediation.
The hope, then, is that new interventions, being planned and implemented now, will be able to
use the concepts contained within these pages. Even more pressing is the hope that cities will adopt
policies to address poor design choices before ATD interventions become more prevalent in the future.
Terrifyingly, attacks are unlikely to desist unless there is a radical ideological shift in terrorist groups.
This, however, is unlikely to happen unless counterterrorism strategies invest more in education in at-risk
countries and less in eradication of ideology through force. However, it is much more difficult to
eliminate ideas rather than people, which certainly goes beyond the scope of this thesis.
As time progresses, it is likely that terrorist attacks will evolve, meriting different system
responses including ones that are unlikely to be solely physical. However, the strategies and interventions
we see now have a way of becoming manifest and acceptable in the built environment. It is imperative
that American downtowns retain the qualities that make them great. Militaristic antiterrorism design must
be optimized by CPTED and humanized by public realm civic design. The American people deserve
downtowns that are open and safe from crime as well as terrorism. Inspiring fear in terrorists should not
come at the cost of inspiring fear in the American people.
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